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WORSE THAN PIRATES OR PRUSSIAN CHANCELLORS: A STATE’S AUTHORITY
TO OPT-OUT OF THE QUID PRO QUO
Michael C. Duff*
Privatization of public law dispute resolution in workplaces has been under intense
scrutiny in the context of arbitration. Another kind of workplace dispute privatization is presently
underway, or under serious consideration, in several states. In connection with state workers’
compensation statutes, one state has implemented, and others are considering, a dispute
resolution model in which employers are explicitly authorized to “opt out” of coverage.
“Alternative benefit plans,” created under such statutes, permit employers to, among other
things, unilaterally and without limitation designate private fact-finders, whose conclusions are
subject to highly deferential judicial review. This model is arbitration on steroids. While there
may be doubts in some quarters about the neutrality of arbitrators, reasonable doubts about the
loyalties of an employer-appointed fact-finder are inevitable. Such a design would mark a
decisive break with the quid pro quo/Grand Bargain of the early twentieth century, and there is a
risk of some states getting caught up in a “race to the bottom,” where states not recognizing a
right to a remedy for physical injury become havens of low-cost labor, and thus exert pressure
on states that safeguard traditional rights to follow suit.
In response to this newest wave of innovation, the Supreme Court may be forced to
intimate an opinion on the constitutional right to a remedy for personal, and especially physical,
injury (whether within or outside of the workplace). The Court has not squarely addressed the
issue since 1917, when it decided New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, a case originally upholding
the constitutionality of workers’ compensation systems. In White, the Court hinted, but did not
clearly establish, that the right to a remedy for physical injury may not be abolished without
substitution of a reasonable remedy.
Workers’ compensation opt out is in reality part of a larger discussion about “tort
reform.” This article discusses various theories of restraint of state legislatures implementing
reforms in personal injury remedies. Ultimately the article concludes that the judiciary should
apply heightened scrutiny when considering constitutional challenges to significant reforms of
such remedies. No civilized society would subject significant legislative reductions to remedies
for personal injury to merely cursory judicial review.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Privatization1 of public law dispute resolution in workplaces has been under intense
scrutiny in recent years, most frequently in the context of arbitration.2 Whether one agrees or
disagrees with compulsory arbitration of workplace claims, its existence is no longer
remarkable.3 Yet, it might be surprising to some that compulsory arbitration has expanded
beyond workplace disputes to tort claims and personal injury actions. A close reading of the
Supreme Court’s startling4 2012 opinion in Marmet Health Care Center v. Brown,5 in which the
Court announced, in a per curiam opinion, that personal injury and wrongful death suits are
covered by the Federal Arbitration Act,6 suggests that the scope of arbitration will likely
expand.7 As important as the policies and values inherent in employment law may be, the law of
personal injury is older, even ancient.8 Tort values are difficult to square with notions of
arbitration contracts or of the waiver of rights in employment or commercial contexts.9 A
requirement that an employee—or anyone—must compromise the right to a personal injury
lawsuit before understanding the nature or extent of a subsequently suffered injury is disquieting.
1

U.S. EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.002 (July 10, 1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html (“1. SUBJECT:
Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of
Employment.”) (arguing that compulsory arbitration privatizes governmental anti-discrimination enforcement).
2
See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html?_r=1.
3
See generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 7-9
(2013).
4
Readers, believing that people entering into arbitration agreements read or understand what they are entering into,
may not have been startled by the opinion. Others might have sympathy with the West Virginia Supreme Court’s
view that “as a matter of public policy under West Virginia Law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission
agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall not
be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning the negligence.” Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis
Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 292 (W. Va. 2011), vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 132 S.
Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam).
5
132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
6
Id. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) federalizes agreements to arbitrate. If a court concludes that such an
agreement exists, it will, as a matter of federal law, enforce it and dismiss, or hold in abeyance court suits filed on
the merits of disputes even arguable within the agreement’s ambit. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 25-26 (1991).
7
Marmet Health, 132 S. Ct. at 1203 (“The statute’s text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death
claims. It ‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.’”) (internal citation omitted). It is worth
noting that the American Bar Association has taken a formal position against the type of pre-injury waivers of
wrongful death claims that were at issue in Marmet. See ABA Comm’n on Law and Aging, Rep. 111B (2009)
(adopted by the House of Delegates Feb. 16, 2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2009_my_111b.authcheckdam.pdf.
8
Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 1127,
1128 (1990):
Judges from the seventeenth century in England to the nineteenth century in the United States
expressed in their tort decisions the same policies, the same values, and the same principles. They
used tort law to make people behave in morally appropriate ways by holding them to community
standards of reasonable behavior in the circumstances in order to minimize injuries and losses, and
to promote honesty and fairness in economic relationships. In certain kinds of cases, these
principles led judges to hold defendants strictly liable.
9
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury
Claims, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 253, 273 (2004) (“At the extreme, unrestrained enforcement of arbitration
clauses could make all tort policy considerations disappear altogether”).

2

The American Arbitration Association has frequently declined to conduct arbitrations based on
pre-injury agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice cases.10 Even during the peak of
industrialism, not far removed in time from Lochner, some late nineteenth century courts refused
to enforce pre-injury waivers of tort suits—the exclusive cause of action for workplace injury
prior to the early twentieth century—by employees against their employers.11
Another kind of workplace dispute privatization is presently underway in several states.12
In connection with century-old workers’ compensation laws—the successors to tort laws and
especially to the law of negligence13—one state has implemented,14 and others are considering,15
a dispute resolution model in which employers are authorized to opt out of coverage by workers’
compensation statutes. “Alternative benefit plans,” created under opt-out statutes,16 permit
employers to, among other things, designate private workers’ compensation fact finders,17 whose
findings of fact are subjected to highly deferential judicial review.18 This model is arbitration on
steroids. While there may be doubts in some quarters about the neutrality of arbitrators,19
reasonable doubts about the loyalties of an employer-appointed fact-finder are inevitable.20
Preliminarily, it might be argued that an employer’s opting out of coverage by a workers’
compensation statute is acceptable if employees have knowingly signed pre-injury waivers of
workers’ compensation benefits. Leaving to one side whether such a waiver would ever tend to
be knowing, experience in Texas (the largest opt-out state)21 has shown that employers
frequently make no attempt to have their employees sign waivers.22
10

Crossman v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 738 S.E.2d 737, 739 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of
Ridgeway, 759 S.E.2d 727, 730 (S.C. 2014).
11
Johnson v. Philadelphia & R.R. Co., 29 A.854 (Pa. 1894).
12
See infra Part III.
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra Part III. B.
15
Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp,
PROPUBLICA, Oct. 14, 2015, https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workerscomp [hereinafter Grabell & Berkes].
16
TEX. LAB. CODE. ANN. § 406.002 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A §§ 3, 202 (West 2015).
17
See Oklahoma Injury Benefit Act, which states:
The claimant may appeal in writing an initial adverse benefit determination to an appeals
committee within one hundred eighty (180) days following his or her receipt of the adverse benefit
determination. The appeal shall be heard by a committee consisting of at least three people that
were not involved in the original adverse benefit determination. The appeals committee shall not
give any deference to the claimant’s initial adverse benefit determination in its review.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A § 211(B)(1) (West 2015). Thus, the employer may appoint as fact finder any three
individuals who “were not involved in the original adverse benefit determination.”
18
See infra Part III. B.
19
See generally Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (2011).
20
“Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable, but ‘our system of law has always endeavored
to prevent even the probability of unfairness.’” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (internal citations
omitted).
21
See infra Part III. A.
22
Although dated, figures from 2001 showed that only about seven percent of opt-out employers required their
employees to sign waivers. Joseph Shields & John Schnautz, Litigation Trends and the Use of Liability Waivers by
Nonsubscribing Employers, 6:4 TEXAS MONITOR (Winter 2001) (RESEARCH & OVERSIGHT COUNCIL ON WORKERS’
COMP., TEX. DEP’T INS.), available at http://www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/wcreg/mon6-4waiver.html.
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Workers’ compensation law generally limits employees to workers’ compensation
benefits in lieu of tort damages for personal injuries suffered in the workplace, a principle known
as “the exclusive remedy rule.”23 In states that retain the exclusive remedy rule and that allow
employers to opt-out of the workers’ compensation system, employees of opt-out employers are
left with no legal remedy for workplace injury. Admittedly, employees acquiescing to
mandatory arbitration of other employment claims are often in similar straits.24 However,
workers’ compensation opt-out potentially leaves employees even more vulnerable,25 because of
the possible scope and magnitude of injury claims,26 and because of employers’ legallyconferred discretion to choose dispute fact finders.27
This article discusses both opt-out and a type of incremental erosion of workers’
compensation benefits transpiring in some states.28 More broadly, this article concerns “tort
reform.” At times, this article discusses, interchangeably, state legislative remedial limitations of
tort and workers’ compensation because the two bodies of law each concern state law remedies
for personal, and especially physical, injury.29 Thus, while this article is about the somewhat
novel workers’ compensation opt-out phenomenon, it is more broadly about the authority of
states to curtail the right to a remedy for personal injury. The question has come up repeatedly in
recent decades in contexts such as “tort reform,”30 “medical malpractice reform,”31 and the
application of state statutes of repose to bar tort claims.32 In short, the question of the limits of
state interference with tort remedies comes up whenever legislatures attempt to decrease plaintiff
tort compensation.33 Virtually the same questions are implicated by workers’ compensation
reform because workers’ compensation rights have been, from their inception, explicitly derived
from tort rights.34 Workers’ compensation claimants stand in the historical shoes of torts
plaintiffs.35 Generally speaking, opt-out implicates the complete elimination of a right to a

23

MICHAEL C. DUFF, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 326 (2013).
As a practical matter, there is almost no substantive judicial review of an arbitration award. 9 U.S.C.S. §§ 9-11
(2008).
25
For an excellent introduction to opt-out, see Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15.
26
In 2014, private industry reported three million nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses, a rate of roughly 3.2
cases per 100 full-time workers. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., Employer-Reported Workplace
Injuries and Illnesses—2014 (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/osh.pdf.
27
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. In Texas and Oklahoma employers are able to combine opt-out
with arbitration. See infra Parts III. A., III. B.
28
See infra Part III.
29
See, e.g., infra Part IV. A.
30
Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789, 795 (Or. 1995) (upholding $500,000 statutory cap on awards of noneconomic
damages in wrongful death actions on theory that plaintiff had received a substantial remedy).
31
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 829 (N.H. 1980) (striking several provisions modifying tort law as applied to
medical malpractice); see infra Part IV. C.
32
Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 319-20 (N.D. 1986).
33
Typical legislative reforms have included measures capping damages and attorney fees, adopting shortened
statutes of limitations or statutes of repose, increasing the difficulty of certifying class actions, mandating bifurcation
or other means of restructuring trials, narrowing standards of liability, providing for close judicial review of jury
findings, abolishing or limiting joint and several liability, and abolishing the collateral source rule. John C.P.
Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs,
115 YALE L.J. 524, 527 (2005).
34
Jean C. Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System and No-Fault
Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers’ Compensation), 73 CAL. L. REV. 857, 857 (1985).
35
Tort reform has come in waves.
24

4

remedy for workplace injury,36 while the incremental erosion of rights concerns the adequacy of
benefits.37 Debates over tort reform often involve tort caps, especially caps of noneconomic
damages,38 which is a question of adequacy. Workers’ compensation benefits do not allow for
the possibility of noneconomic benefits,39 and while it would be rare in the course of a tort
reform debate for someone to propose that the amount of a plaintiff’s damages be within the
exclusive control of a tort defendant, in essence, that is what opt-out permits.40
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II provides workers’ compensation history
and context to assist with contextualizing legislative workers’ compensation benefit reduction
initiatives, including opt-out. Part III describes the roiling workers’ compensation backdrop in
three states; Subparts A and B address Texas and Oklahoma, presently the only states with
enacted opt-out statutes,41 thereby representing the most dramatic break to date with the
historical workers’ compensation mode. Subpart C examines Florida, a state that has allegedly
incrementally eroded its workers’ compensation benefits to the point where the benefits are
unreasonable or inadequate.42 Part IV of this Article discusses the prospect of restraining state
“tort reform” through “right to remedy,”43 “open courts,”44 or “quid pro quo”45 provisions in
state constitutions. Part V concludes by discussing the possibility of restraining states through
operation of federal due process principles first articulated by the Supreme Court in its seminal
1917 opinion in New York Cent. R. Co. v. White,46 a case originally upholding the
constitutionality of the American workers’ compensation model.47 Part V argues that White may
have been employing an early form of historical due process analysis. The argument contends
that, even if White cannot be comprehended within the Supreme Court’s historical due process
In the first wave of retrenchment, businesses sought changes in rules of law, but . . . the general
public, more so than courts, were the target of the efforts at persuasion. . . . In the mid-80s, a
second wave of increased insurance premiums hit multiple sectors, including the automotive and
health care industries. . . . As in the 1970s, state legislatures responded to a rapid rise in liability
insurance rates by enacting measures that capped pain and suffering damages, limited punitive
damages, restricted the collateral source rule, and modified or eliminated joint and several liability
rules. In 1986 alone, forty-one of forty-six state legislatures enacted some type of tort reform
measure. . . . The effort to nationalize tort law can be seen as a “third wave” of tort retrenchment.
John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1029-32 (2005).
36
Texas, as will be seen is the exception. See infra Part III. A. Unlike Oklahoma, opt-out employers in Texas are
liable in tort. As a practical matter, the tort right in Texas is eviscerated by compulsory arbitration. See infra Part III.
B. Thus, it is the combination of opt-out and arbitration that has, practically speaking, killed workers’ tort rights in
Texas.
37
See infra Part III. C.
38
See infra note 406 and accompanying text.
39
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
40
The existing structures provide either for payment of the same “forms” of benefits (Oklahoma), or impose no duty
on the employer to implement a plan with benefits (Texas). See infra Parts III. A., III. B.
41
See infra Parts III. A., III. B.
42
See, e.g., Stahl v. Hialeah Hospital, 160 So.3d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), rev granted, 2015 WL 6126944
(challenging as unconstitutional requirement that injured workers contribute to medical expense occasioned by
work-related injury).
43
See infra Part IV. A.
44
See infra Part IV. A.
45
See infra Part IV. B.
46
243 U.S. 188, 207-09 (1917); accord Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1919).
47
White, 243 U.S. at 209.

5

modalities, principles of “structural due process” and “Lockean provisos” compel a conclusion
that our legal order should find repugnant inadequate remedies for negligently-caused physical
injury or for accidental injury comprehended within the historical workers’ compensation “grand
bargain.”48
II.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ESSENTIAL HISTORY AND PRESENT CONTEXT

The essential theory of workers’ compensation law is straightforward. When a worker is
injured, compensation is swiftly and, more or less, automatically provided according to some
pre-existing measure or schedule of benefits.49 This idea is not new. In roughly the last third of
the seventeenth century, the governing articles of Captain Morgan’s great pirate ships allowed
that buccaneers wounded and maimed on voyages—presumably while plundering fat Spanish
galleons—would be compensated according to a schedule of listed harms.50 These were early
glimmerings of the emergence of a workers’ compensation insurance “system.” By the
nineteenth century, Otto von Bismarck had become an adherent of the view that workers injured
in the course of employment ought to be compensated efficiently and humanely.51 Bismarck’s
views were admittedly offered in the service of Christendom and born of a fierce opposition to
socialism and communism;52 nevertheless, they were not what a contemporary person might
expect from the chancellor of “blood and iron.”53 The ideal of workers’ compensation caught on
across the then-industrializing late nineteenth century world, and had spread to the United States
by 1910.54 The rudimentary concept was that negligence lawsuits would be “exchanged” for
statutorily pre-determined benefits.55 Workers with viable negligence claims would probably
receive less compensation under a workers’ compensation statute than they might have in tort.56
But, on average, many more workers were likely to receive some compensation for work-related
injuries under workers’ compensation statutes than in negligence suits.57 In negligence, workers
were frequently defeated by affirmative defenses and ultimately received no compensation58—an
outcome made much less likely through passage of workers’ compensation statutes.
By 1917, the Supreme Court had held that a state legislature (New York’s) could
permissibly substitute workers’ compensation benefits for tort remedies, provided that the
48

See infra Part V. A.
Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1993).
50
STEPHEN TALTY, EMPIRE OF BLUE WATER: CAPTAIN MORGAN’S GREAT PIRATE ARMY, THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE
AMERICAS, AND THE CATASTROPHE THAT ENDED THE OUTLAW’S BLOODY REIGN 58-59 (2007); N.Y. STATE
WORKERS’ COMP. BD., CENTENNIAL 7 (2014) (citing ALEXANDER O. EXQUEMELIN, THE BUCCANEERS OF AMERICA
(1678) (translated by Alexis Brown)), http://www.wcb.ny.gov/WCB_Centenial_Booklet.pdf.
51
Otto von Bismarck, Practical Christianity, in 20 THE GERMAN CLASSICS 221, 228 (1914),
http://www.unz.org/Pub/FranckeKuno-1913v10-00221.
52
A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman 57 (1967).
53
Id.
54
Commentators typically reference the year 1910 as the beginning of the workers’ compensation reception period,
though it is difficult to fix the date with precision. See generally Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The
Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & Econ. 305, 305-06 (1998)
[hereinafter Fishback & Kantor].
55
Fishback & Kantor, supra note 54 at 305-06..
56
PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN E. KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION 4 (2000) [hereinafter FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE].
57
Id.
58
Affirmative defenses that became known as the “unholy trinity”: assumption of the risk, contributory negligence,
and the fellow servant rule. See DUFF, supra note 23, at 371.
49
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substitution was not “repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”59 The Court
was careful to emphasize that it did not have before it a case in which a state was attempting to
“suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting liability as between employer and
employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute.”60 The substitute deemed adequate
was payment to an injured worker of wage-loss indemnity benefits, payment for surgical and
medical treatment associated with a workplace injury, and, in the event of work-related death,
payment of funeral expenses and wage-loss benefits to the worker’s surviving family.61 The
Court also recognized that the system would be operated by a public, state administrative
commission.62 These features, therefore, were implicitly deemed to be a reasonable substitute
for a tort suit.
At the present moment in history, the continued viability of the workers’ compensation
tort substitute, the quid pro quo, endorsed by White, is in question. The two poles of argument in
constant operation will be familiar to many readers. On the one hand, it might be argued that
workers’ compensation laws are tantamount to “ordinary” common law rules, modifiable at will
by a rational legislature.63 On the other hand, it might be contended that the transition to
workers’ compensation, a socially massive undertaking involving historically important remedies
for personal injury, would not have been acceptable in the absence of a widespread
understanding that substitute benefits under the system could continue to be available and
“reasonable.”64
This quid pro quo debate is perplexing but not academic. Some state legislatures seem
poised to authorize wholesale substitution of employer-created alternative benefit plans for
workers’ compensation remedies.65 Oklahoma has already done so.66 Apart from opt-out, other
states have demonstrated a willingness to allow significant modifications of workers’
compensation rights by reducing the amount or duration of medical and wage-loss indemnity
benefits.67 Oklahoma’s abrupt embarkation on the opt-out route instantly generated litigation.68
On the other hand, over time, Florida has made significant but incremental reductions to its
workers’ compensation benefits, provoking periodic litigation resistance.69 The Florida model of
incremental erosion is not unique. The Demolition of Workers’ Comp,70 a recent and muchdiscussed article produced jointly by ProPublica and National Public Radio, contends that,
“[o]ver the past decade, state after state has been dismantling America’s workers’ comp system
59

White, 243 U.S. at 208. The logical corollary, of course, is that such a substitution could be repugnant.
Id. at 201. The logical corollary is that such a sudden set-aside without a “reasonably just substitute” could be
problematic, though on what Fourteenth Amendment theory readily applicable in 1917 is not clear.
61
Id. at 193.
62
Id. at 194.
63
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 144 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting).
64
See generally Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001); see infra Part IV.
65
See Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15; see also supra note 16.
66
See infra Part III. B.
67
Emily A. Spieler & John F. Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence Between Work-Related Disability and
Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Benefits, 55 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 487, 498-502 (2012) (discussing benefit
reductions and other obstacles to employee pursuit of legitimate workers’ compensation claims).
68
See infra Part III. B.; see generally Coates v. Fallin, 316 P.3d 924 (Okla. 2013).
69
See infra Part III. C.; see generally Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 WL 6685226, at ¶ 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 13, 2014) (dismissed on procedural grounds).
70
Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 4, 2015),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-demolition-of-workers-compensation [hereinafter Grabell & Berkes,
Demolition].
60

7

with disastrous consequences for many of the hundreds of thousands of people who suffer
serious injuries at work each year.”71
On the contemporary opt-out front, the popular press has reported that a corporate-funded
lobbying group, the Association for Responsible Alternatives to Workers’ Compensation
(“ARAWC”), stated that “the corporations ultimately want to change workers’ comp laws in all
50 states.”72 On its website, the ARAWC discusses Tennessee as a state in which opt-out is
actively under construction.73 An “Employee Injury Benefit Alternative” was introduced in the
Tennessee Senate in 2015 but did not pass.74 A second attempt was made in the spring of 2016,
but the bill failed, possibly due to an ethics controversy surrounding the bill’s sponsor.75
ARAWC’s materials suggest that it has national ambitions,76 and South Carolina appears to be
the group’s next target of opportunity.77

71

Id.
Molly Redden, Walmart, Lowe’s, Safeway, and Nordstrom Are Bankrolling a Nationwide Campaign to Gut
Workers’ Comp, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 26, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/03/arawcwalmart-campaign-against-workers-compensation (citing Stephanie K. Jones, Group Aims to Create Alternatives to
Workers’ Comp State-by-State, Ins. Journal, Nov. 10, 2014,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/11/10/346291.htm); see also Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15.
73
See Tennessee Option, ASS’N FOR RESPONSIBLE ALT. TO WORKERS’ COMP., http://arawc.org/statepriorities/tennessee/ (last visited May 25, 2016).
74
See S. B. 721, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015). It is anticipated that the bill will be reintroduced
with revisions in 2016. Amy O’Connor Tennessee Workers Comp Opt-Out Legislation Revised, Ready for Next
Session, INS. JOURNAL, June 1, 2015, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/06/01/370065/htm. By
all accounts, the proposed Tennessee bill is more extreme than Oklahoma’s statute.
72

[I]t eliminates an entire genre of benefits. Indeed, the bill’s mandated plan benefits do not provide
for any permanency benefits: No permanent partial or permanent total benefits. It eliminates
lifetime medical benefits, capping medical at $300,000, thereby jeopardizing treatment of workers
with the most serious injuries. Nor are there funeral benefits, nor for ancillary benefits common in
workers’ compensation systems—van and home modification, custodial care, hearing aids, and
artificial limbs.
David B. Torrey, Appendix B: Statement of the American Insurance Association: Legislation Permitting Employer
Opt-Out of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation System, Mar. 9, 2015, in The Opt-Out of Workers’
Compensation Legislation in the Southern States, Keynote Speaker at MCLE New England: 16th Annual Workers’
Comp. Conference 2015 (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.davetorrey.info/files/Torrey.MCLE._Mass_Optout.10.26.15final.pdf.
75
See Stephanie Goldberg, Did texting scandal derail Tennessee workers comp opt-out effort?, BUS. INS. (Feb. 4,
2016), http://businessinsurance.com/artice//20160204/NEWS08/160209901/did-texting-scandal-derail-tennesseeworkers-comp-opt-out-effort?tags=%7C92%7C329%7C304.
76
From the AWARC’s website:
The Association for Responsible Alternatives to Workers’ Compensation (ARAWC) is a national
organization comprised of employers, workers’ compensation system providers, and industry
experts dedicated to enacting state workers’ compensation alternatives (an Option) that deliver
better outcomes to employees, while giving employers a choice in how they manage their injury
benefits programs.
ARAWC, About Us, http://arawc.org/about/ (last visited May 5, 2016).
77
Amy O’Connor, South Carolina Jumps Aboard Workers’ Comp Alternative Bandwagon, INS. JOURNAL (June 10,
2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/06/10/371088.htm.
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Observers of workers’ compensation reform acknowledge that its overall purpose is to
save businesses money.78 The essential issue then, is the legal limit of business subsidization by
the states. A business environment without rules—without workers’ compensation or tort—is
clearly a much cheaper place to operate, and it is apparent that the opt-out movement has its
sights set on elimination of an employer’s obligation to pay permanent incapacity benefits.79
The question is whether there are any constitutional limitations on that subsidization and,
therefore, any principled limit on legislative privatization of public rights. In the workers’
compensation context, White once appeared to require that tort substitutions for workplace injury
be “reasonably just” to pass judicial muster.80 If none of White remains viable, it may be a short
road to judicial authorization of any legislative reduction of personal injury remedies, as states
race to the bottom and the federal courts refuse to intervene. If money is the predominant
measure of rationality, the lowest cost workers’ compensation or tort system will always be, at a
minimum, rational.81
III.

A TALE OF THREE STATES: TEXAS, OKLAHOMA, AND FLORIDA
A. Texas

Texas is unique among the states,82 with a workers’ compensation system that has
allowed employers to opt out of the system entirely since its conception in the early twentieth
century.83 More precisely, while several other states initially enacted elective statutes (like the
one in Texas), they all subsequently switched to compulsory systems.84 Employers in Texas,

78

Workers’ Compensation Opt-Out: Can Privatization Work?, NEW STREET GROUP (Nov. 2012),
https://www.sedgwik.com/docs/pressrelease/WCOpt-OutStudy.pdf. Opt-out proponents complain that the system
has become too expensive because employers lack control over provider selection, enforcement of “evidence-based”
medicine is insufficient, pharmaceutical abuse and use of opioids has been inadequately curtailed, the complexity of
terminating temporary disability is excessive, permanent partial disability awards have been pervasive, and dispute
resolution procedures are expensive and cumbersome. Id. at 6.
79
With respect to the elimination of permanent incapacity benefits, see infra note 176 and accompanying text. In
2013, the direct costs of workers’ compensation injuries were roughly $60 billion. See 2016 Liberty Mutual
Workplace Safety Index, LIBERTY MUT. RESEARCH INST. FOR SAFETY, https://www.libertymutualgroup.com/aboutliberty-mutual-site/research-institute-site/Documents/2016%20WSI.pdf (last visited May 26, 2016).
80
See White, supra, note 46 and accompanying text.
81
Cf. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 626 (“Whatever its advantages, a society without a law for the redress of private
wrongs may be a society more prone than ours to accept a relatively thin, Holmesian notion of legal obligation, a
less robust civil society, and a more statist conception of how government interacts with its citizens.”).
82
See Meagan Flynn, Don’t Fall Down on the Job in Texas: Employers Don’t Have to Provide Injury Coverage,
HOUSTON PRESS (Feb. 2, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/don-t-fall-down-on-the-job-in-texasemployers-don-t-have-to-provide-injury-coverage-8120319. Texas is not the only current opt-out state. Oklahoma,
soon to be discussed, is the second such state. It may technically be correct to say that Oklahoma is not a “true” optout state because it formally requires employers to “comply” with its workers’ compensation statute authorizing optout. The difference is semantical, however, as the article will describe, the statute provides employers two methods
to not comply with the “traditional” law: opt-out and arbitration. See infra Part III. B.
83
In Texas, opt-out employers may either withdraw from the system entirely and “go bare,” or establish an
“alternative benefit plan,” providing a form of putatively contractual benefits that need not conform in any manner
to the statutory workers’ compensation system. See infra Part III. A.
84
Initially, during the first two decades of the twentieth century, many workers’ compensation statutes throughout
the United States were elective. Thus, employers in several states were permitted to “not opt in,” which was the
functional equivalent of opting out. States structuring their statutes in this way did so out of concern that the U.S.
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including large employers, routinely opt-out.85 What makes Texas paradigmatic is not its “new”
approach but its perennial status as a deregulatory model.86 Critics of the Texas system allege
that:
Most Texans who are outside the workers’ comp system—more than a million
people—do get private occupational insurance from their employers. But those
plans aren’t regulated by the state and can be crafted to sharply limit employees’
benefits, legal rights and health care choices. Only 41 percent of the plans include
death benefits, for example, according to state surveys.87
Texas has been at or near the top of national workplace death rates in recent years,88 and
explanations abound as to why this is so.89 Whatever the reasons, there have been dramatic
industrial mishaps involving opt-out employers. For example, one of the underpublicized facts
revealed during investigation of the devastating fertilizer facility explosion that rocked West
Texas in April 2013—a blast that registered 2.1 on the Richter scale90—was that the company
running the plant was a “nonsubscriber,” an opt-out employer.91 Although none of the plant’s
workers were injured or killed in the blast,92 the company would have suffered no heightened
workers’ compensation expense had those workers become victims. Despite having the regular
practice of storing the explosive substance, ammonium nitrate, on its premises, the plant was
insured for only one million dollars.93 Damages resulting from the accident were estimated at
100 million dollars.94 Under-deterrence and under-insurance were, in other words, a pervasive
feature of the plant’s operations, and opt-out was intertwined with this unsafe profile.95
Supreme Court would strike down compulsory workers’ compensation systems on due process grounds. See
FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 93, 104.
85
COSTCO provides a ready example of a large employer taking advantage of the opportunity to provide a nonstatutory injury reimbursement option. See New Street Group, supra note 78, at 27.
86
Jason Ohana, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation: A Model of Innovation?, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 323,
339 (2011).
87
Jay Root, Hurting for Work, TEXAS TRIBUNE (June 29, 2014), http://apps.texastribune.org/hurting-for-work/.
88
See Bill Bowen, As Workplace Deaths Fall Nationally, They Remain Stubbornly High in Texas, DALLAS
MORNING News (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20120915-as-workplace-deathsfall-nationally-they-remain-stubbornly-high-in-texas.ece.
89
See, e.g., James Gordon, Death on the Job: Texas Workers More Likely to Die Than Counterparts Elsewhere,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Aug. 16, 2014), http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/2014_workplace/.
90
Ian Urbina et al., After Plant Explosion, Texas Remains Wary of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/us/after-plant-explosion-texas-remains-wary-ofregulation.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=all.
91
Arthur D. Postal, West Fertilizer Blast Spotlights Texas Workers Comp System, Okla. Legislation, Property
Casualty 360° (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/04/24/west-fertilizer-blast-spotlighttexas-workers-com.
92
The explosion killed fifteen non-employees and injured two hundred others. Doug J. Swanson & Reese Dunklin,
West Fertilizer Co. Was Insured For Only $1 Million, A Fraction of The Estimated Losses, DALLAS MORNING NEWS
(May 3, 2013, 11:03 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/west-explosion/headlines/20130503-west-fertilizer-co.was-insured-for-only-1-million-a-fraction-of-the-estimated-losses.ece.
93
Id.
94
An amount a mere two hundred and fifty thousand dollars higher than the seven hundred and fifty thousand
dollars that is required for a company to insure a single egg truck on the roadways. Id.
95
The West explosion obviously cannot be thought to reflect the erosion of a historically non-mandatory Texas
system. However, because in Texas a non-subscriber is authorized to either develop an alternative plan regulated by
ERISA, or to “go bare” in hard economic times, the incentive for underinsurance seems high.
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One of the ameliorating features of the Texas opt-out system is that employees of opt-out
employers retain the right to sue their employers in tort for workplace injuries.96 However, optout employers providing their employees an alternative benefit plan—a benefit not required
under Texas law, which permits employers to “go bare” and provide no wage loss or medical
benefits at all97—may effectively require their employees to waive a tort suit and participate in
arbitration as a condition of employment.98 While pre-injury waivers of the right to sue are
forbidden under Texas law,99 the Texas courts have held that the state may not prohibit the
waivers then accompanied by a promise to arbitrate as a result of preemption by the Federal
Arbitration Act.100 As one commentator has noted:
[I]f an employer can secure waivers from its employees before injuries, it can
effectively neutralize the threat of negligence suits. It can thus secure the
principal benefit of a workers’ compensation system, namely near immunity from
employer’s liability lawsuits, while at the same time providing stingy or no
benefits to the employees in return.101
In Texas, opting out of the workers’ compensation system requires only that an employer
notify the Texas Workers’ Compensation Division of the Department of Insurance of its opt-out
status and that it inform employees at the time of hire of the status.102 An employer must also
conspicuously post notices of its opt-out status in the workplace.103 In 2014, 33 percent of Texas
employers opted out of the workers’ compensation system.104 An estimated 20 percent of Texas
private-sector employees (representing approximately 1.9 million employees in 2014) worked
for non-subscribing employers.105 In 2014, two-thirds of non-subscribing employers,
representing about 22 percent of Texas employers overall, provided no alternative benefit
plan.106 However, because Texas opt-out employers providing alternative benefit plans tend to
be large, they employ 75 percent of the opt-out employee population.107 Thus, in Texas, 25
percent of the 1.9 million opt-out employees—475,000 employees—are not covered by
alternative benefit plans nor by the workers’ compensation statute.
Concerning the alternative benefit plans for those who are covered by such mechanisms,
employers have no obligation to match or even approach the level of statutory workers’
96

See Sheena Harrison, Texas Employers Still Opting Out Despite Lawsuits, BUSINESS INSURANCE (Jan. 17, 2016,
12:01 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160117/NEWS08/301179995/texas-employers-still-optingout-of-states-workers-compensation.
97
See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2015).
98
See Harrison, supra note 96.
99
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(e) (West 2015).
100
More precisely, the FAA would require a court to grant a motion to compel arbitration and either dismiss or hold
in abeyance a post-injury lawsuit. On the ever encroaching phenomenon of arbitration, see Amalia D. Kessler,
Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2942-43
(2015).
101
Ohana, supra note 86, at 355.
102
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.005 (West 2015).
103
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.005 (West 2015).
104
TEX. DEP’T OF INS., SETTING THE STANDARD: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE 2005 LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
ON THE TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM, 2014 RESULTS, at 118 (Dec. 2014),
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/dwc/documents/2014regbiennialrpt.pdf.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
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compensation benefits that would otherwise be required by law.108 In the words of former Chief
Justice Hardberger of the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals:
A non-subscribing employer has unfettered discretion in determining the amount
of benefits it will provide employees under an alternative plan. In exchange for
these benefits, regardless of how minimal, the worker is prevented from
presenting his claims to a jury by being required either to waive his right to sue or
to submit his claims to binding arbitration. This is unacceptable.109
Under the Texas system of workers’ compensation arbitration, figures show that
employers require their employees to sign an arbitration agreement for personal injury before an
injury has occurred, and that three-quarters of employers requiring arbitration knew the arbitrator
who presided at arbitration hearings, and that in half of those instances the arbitrator was
employed by the employer.110
Based on these patchwork features, it could be reasonably questioned whether workers’
compensation actually exists in Texas as a rights-based system. However, because Texas never
accepted a compulsory workers’ compensation system,111 it is difficult to contend that a societal
grand bargain was breached. Both employers and employees have been able to opt out of (or not
opt in to) Texas workers’ compensation from its inception.112 To the extent that employees are
denied the opportunity of a reasonable remedy for workplace injury, the question of whether the
108

Phil Hardberger, C.J., Texas Workers’ Compensation: A Ten Year Survey – Strengths, Weaknesses, and
Recommendations, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 7 (2000).
109
Id. See also Ohana, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation, supra note 86, at 341-42.
Of the 52 percent of non-subscribing employers that paid occupational injury benefits in 2008,
only 70 percent covered medical costs. Of those that covered medical costs, 63 percent covered
expenses for as long as they were medically necessary, while the remaining 37 percent capped
medical expenses either with a dollar limit, a time limit, or both. Applying these percentages to the
larger universe of non-subscribers, the total percentage of non-subscribers that provided a medical
expense benefit to injured employees in 2008 was approximately 36 percent, with approximately
23 percent of non-subscribers providing benefits for as long as medically necessary and 13 percent
providing benefits up to a time or dollar limit. The numbers are similar for wage replacement
benefits. Approximately 35 percent of all non-subscribers paid occupational injury benefits and 68
percent of those non-subscribers paid wage replacement benefits in 2008. Of these, 57 percent
paid wage replacement benefits for the entire duration of the employee’s lost time; the remaining
43 percent paid wage replacement benefits subject to a durational or dollar limit. Again, applying
these percentages to the larger universe of non-subscribers, only about 20 percent of nonsubscribers provided wage replacement benefits for the entire duration of their employees’ lost
time.
110

Ohana, supra note 86, at 343-44. As of 2014, it appeared that seventy-nine percent of non-subscribers using
arbitration (14 percent in 2014) required their employees to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of hire.
Approximately sixty-six percent of large non-subscriber employers use arbitration. See EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION
IN THE TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM: 2014 ESTIMATES, at 38, TEXAS DEP’T OF INSURANCE, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION RESEARCH AND EVALUATION GROUP (2014), available at
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/wcreg/documents/nonsub.pdf. Curiously, tracking of employers with ongoing
relationships with arbitrators has not been undertaken in the 2014 Texas Report the 2008 version of which formed
the corpus of Ohana’s findings, see Ohana, supra note 86, at 344.
111
Ohana, supra note 86, at 339.
112
Id.
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Texas system is constitutionally adequate remains open. On the one hand, negligence suits
remain available to employees of opt-out employers. However, this raises the specter of the
cumbersome and expensive tort system, replete with the same affirmative defenses that spurred
the creation of workers’ compensation. At the same time, operation of compulsory arbitration
makes it extremely uncertain that an injured worker will make it to trial.
B. Oklahoma
Oklahoma is the most recent state to adopt a workers’ compensation system that
authorizes opt-out.113 Unlike Texas, Oklahoma requires employers either to formally participate
in the state’s traditional workers’ compensation system—by obtaining insurance or becoming
self-insured—or to submit for state approval an alternative benefit plan.114 Thus, employers in
Oklahoma may not “go bare.”115
Oklahoma employees, compelled to participate in alternative benefit pans, continue to be
bound by the exclusive remedy rule.116 Therefore, unlike the situation in Texas, Oklahoma
employees participating in an alternative benefit plan (who are therefore not entitled to workers’
compensation benefits) are also not entitled to bring tort suits.117 This presents a rather stark
quid pro quo problem because the original rationale for relinquishment of tort rights was the
reciprocal conferral on employees of generous workers’ compensation benefits. Oklahoma
employees of opt-out employers have lost a functional legal right to a remedy for workplace
injury.118 Generally, just as in Texas, workers’ compensation benefits may not lawfully be
waived under the Oklahoma Act.119 However, and also as is the case in Texas,120 employers may
enter into agreements with employees waiving workers’ compensation benefits in lieu of
arbitration.121 And, such agreements are probably enforceable under the Federal Arbitration
Act.122
Some background is required to grasp these developments. In 2013, the Oklahoma
legislature abrogated the former Workers’ Compensation Code123 and replaced it with three
interrelated statutes: the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act,124 the Oklahoma Employee
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See, e.g., Pilkington v. Doak, No. PR-113662, 3 (Okla. 2015) (review denied).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, §§ 3, 202 (West 2015).
115
They may, however, enter into agreements with employees to arbitrate workers’ compensation claims under a
discrete section of the Workers’ Compensation Act called, “The Workers’ Compensation Arbitration Act.” OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 300 (West 2015).
116
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 209(A) (West 2015).
117
Id.
118
The counter to this contention is that employers may be bound to comply with the terms of the alternative plans
they do provide if the plans are covered by ERISA. As a practical matter, this amounts to a requirement that an
employer comply with a plan the terms of which it unilaterally determines, which is not an obligation comporting
with usual conceptions of a “right.”
119
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 8 (West 2015).
120
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 301 (West 2015).
121
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 304 (West 2015).
122
The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the question. See, e.g., Morales v. Odyssey Healthcare, Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 319 (2010) (cert. denied). See Brief for Guadalupe Morales as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22,
In re Morales, 2010 WL 2912538 (2010) (No. 10-134) (arguing among other things that the 10th Amendment
prevents Congress from legislating in traditional state areas).
123
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A (2015).
124
Id. at § 1.
114
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Injury Benefit Act,125 and the Workers’ Compensation Arbitration Act.126 The second of these
statutes, the Employee Injury Benefit Act, would allow “certain employers to adopt and
administer benefit plans consistent with the Administrative Act, and the Workers’ Arbitration
Compensation Act.”127 However, appeals of benefit determinations under the Oklahoma
Employee Injury Benefit Act are made to a private employer’s internal adjudication committee
rather than to a state or other public official.128 Following internal review of the committee
decision, an aggrieved employee may appeal to the state Workers’ Compensation Commission.
This statutory requirement assumes that any occupational injury plan not covered by the
workers’ compensation statute—that is, an alternative benefit plan—is covered by ERISA.
However, this remains an open question.129 The Employee Injury Benefit Act also requires that
the Commission “rely on the record established by the internal appeal process and use an
objective standard of review that is not arbitrary or capricious.”130 The ability of an employer to
opt out is liberally authorized. The employer is required only to provide notice to state officials
and employees,131 develop a written benefit plan,132 post a bond of $1,500,133 and provide
125

Id. at § 200.
Id. at § 300.
127
Coates v. Fallin, 316 P.3d 924, 924 (Okla. 2013).
128
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 211(B)(1-4) (2015). At least one justice of the Oklahoma Supreme Court would find
this provision unconstitutional on its face. Coates, 316 P.3d at 929 (Reif, J., dissenting in part).
129
ERISA provides:
126

The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan” mean any plan, fund, or program
which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is
maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services. . . .
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). The Act in relevant part exempts from ERISA any employee benefit plan
“maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation laws or unemployment
compensation or disability insurance laws.” Id. § 1003(b)(3).
ERISA states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
Id. § 1144(a). However, ERISA exempts in relevant parts any employee benefit plan “maintained solely for the
purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability
insurance laws.” Id. § 1003(b)(3). The underlying logical assumption is that creating an alternative benefit plan is
precisely for the purpose of not complying with a “workmen’s compensation law.” Yet opt-out plans are only
permissible if compliance with the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act is achieved, and it is arguable whether
that statute is a “workmen’s compensation law.”
130
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 211, B., 6 (2015). Notably, this standard of review affords courts less discretion in
reviewing plan decisions than they would have in reviewing an agency decision under the Oklahoma Administrative
Workers’ Compensation Act, which provides traditional APA review. See id. § 78(A).
131
The Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act provides that the employer’s notice must be provided to employees
at the time of hire, and such employers shall notify employees “that it does not carry workers’ compensation
insurance coverage and that such coverage has terminated or been cancelled.” Id. at § 202(H), (I).
132
Id. § 202(A)(2).
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additional assurances to insurance officials that it has sufficient assets “in an amount determined
by the Commissioner which shall be at least an average of the yearly claims for the last three (3)
years.”134 In short, it is meant to be—and is—very easy for an employer to opt out of workers’
compensation by adopting an alternative benefit plan in Oklahoma.135
Procedural innovations, such as those discussed above, do not, of course, immediately
implicate the quid pro quo, which is usually regarded as a question of the adequacy of the
substantive exchange of rights and remedies.136 The procedural due process implications in the
design of employer-dominated “committees,”137 coupled with limited judicial review are plain
enough, but are beyond the scope of this discussion.138 One is inclined to agree with Oklahoma
Supreme Court Justice Combs in Coates v. Fallin,139 the first state Supreme Court case
challenging the constitutionality of the Employee Injury Benefit Act.140 A number of “disparate
treatment” issues under this unilateral employer system will emerge but must await future
judicial analysis.141 Nevertheless, facial quid pro quo challenges, alleging both inadequate
procedure and substance, appear unavoidable and have already begun.142 Furthermore, as
elsewhere in the law, what might initially seem procedural can have a profoundly substantive
impact on a case. As Thomas Main recently wrote, procedure is a tool of power and can negate
substantive rights.143
133

Id. § 202(B).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 204(B)(2)(a)(1) (2015).
135
However, as has been mentioned, it is even easier for an employer to opt-out of the system in Texas as of this
writing. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2013).
136
Kuney v. PMA Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 1285, 1287 (Pa. 1990) (“Where statutory remedies are provided, the procedure
prescribed by the statute must be strictly pursued, to the exclusion of other methods of redress.”) (internal quotations
omitted) (citation omitted).
137
Both Oklahoma and federal courts have insisted that a fundamental element of due process is a fair and impartial
trial. Clark v. Bd. of Educ. Of Indiana School Dist. No. 89, 32 P.3d 851, 854 (Okla. 2001). This includes a neutral
and detached decision maker. Id. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (“Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable, but ‘our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.’”) (citation omitted).
138
In a recent successful administrative challenge to the Injury Benefit Act, procedural due process arguments did
not factor into the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional. Vasquez
v. Dillard’s, Inc., CM-2014-11060L (Okla. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n) (Feb. 26, 2016); see also Michael C. Duff,
Workers’ Comp Agency Declares Oklahoma Opt-Out Statute Unconstitutional, LEXISNEXIS NEWSROOM: WORKERS
COMP. LAW (Feb. 28, 2016, 11:31 PM).
139
316 P.3d 924 (Okla. 2013).
140
See id. at 924-25 (deciding constitutional issues as matters of first impression).
134

141

As the law has not yet taken effect, it is unclear exactly how these issues will manifest themselves
in future cases or controversies, but it is necessary to acknowledge the constitutional problems
these Acts will produce when claimants begin to receive disparate treatment in their recourse to
the law based upon decisions made by their employers.
Id. at 925 (Combs, J., concurring).
142
A leading Oklahoma practitioner informs the author that multiple cases in Oklahoma are pending that charge
legislative violations of the “grand bargain”/quid pro quo. See McAnany, Van Cleave & Philips, P.A., Oklahoma
Workers’ Compensation 17, 19, 20, 21 (2015),
http://www.mvplaw.com/post/articles/Oklahoma%20Materials(1).pdf (listing Duck v. Morgan Tie, No. 113,601
(Okla.), Torres v. Seaboard Foods, No. 113-649 (Okla.), Deason v. Integris Baptist Med. Ctr., No. 113,648 (Okla.),
Mullendore v. Mercy Hosp. Ardmore, No. 113,560 (Okla.), Robinson v. Fairview Fellowship Home, No. 113,735
(Okla.), Brown v. Claims Mgmt. Res., No. 113,609 (Okla.), and Nowlin v. Medicalodges, Inc., No. 113,607 (Okla.)
as pending appeals before the Oklahoma Supreme Court).
143
Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV., 801, 818 (2010).
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Nevertheless, with respect to substance, the alternative benefit plan an employer is
permitted to provide (even as it maintains the exclusive remedy rule)144 is as follows:
The benefit plan shall provide for payment of the same forms of benefits included
in the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act for temporary total disability,
temporary partial disability, permanent partial disability, vocational rehabilitation,
permanent total disability, disfigurement, amputation or permanent total loss of
use of a scheduled member, death and medical benefits as a result of an
occupational injury, on a no-fault basis, with the same statute of limitations, and
with dollar, percentage, and duration limits that are at least equal to or greater
than the dollar, percentage, and duration limits contained in Sections 45, 46 and
47 of this title. For this purpose, the standards for determination of average
weekly wage, death beneficiaries, and disability under the Administrative
Workers’ Compensation Act shall apply under the Oklahoma Employee Injury
Benefit Act; but no other provision of the Administrative Workers’ Compensation
Act defining covered injuries, medical management, dispute resolution or other
process, funding, notices or penalties shall apply or otherwise be controlling
under the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act, unless expressly
incorporated.145
A reading of this language might initially show that the substantive core of the traditional
Act has been preserved.146 However, this preliminary conclusion will not withstand scrutiny and
ignores the depth, range, and subtlety of substantive disputes that arise in workers’ compensation
cases. For example, the provision provides for the same “forms” of benefits for various
categories of disability.147 Perhaps this means that both medical and indemnity benefits are the
only benefits available under the Act. Or, perhaps it means something more. In any event, the
language does not specify amounts of damage for degrees of incapacity, as would be the case in
a workers’ compensation statute. In a similar vein, there may be no question that, if an employee
is totally incapacitated for work, that employee would be entitled to a benefit amount based on
the average weekly wage at the time of injury, as traditionally calculated, and for the duration of
the incapacity;148 yet, the pivotal issue in workers’ compensation claims is often causation.149
Causation lurks behind seemingly banal phrases such as “covered injuries,” “medical
management,” and “dispute resolution,” all of which are explicitly unmoored from the traditional
Act.150 Thus, a causation dispute will often involve sharply contested medical evidence151 that
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See DUFF, supra note 23, at 326.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015).
146
The statute appears to incorporate most of the disability benefits structure of the Act. That is, the provision seems
to require alternative benefits to pay permanent and temporary benefits that are both total and partial. Id. § 45(A)(D).
147
Id.
148
Id. § 45(C)-(D).
149
82 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TO WRONGFUL DISCHARGE § 194 (2d ed. 2013)
(hereinafter “AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE”).
150
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A § 203(B) (2015).
151
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 149, at § 543.
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will now be weighed, credited, or rejected by employer-designated fact finders subject to ultradeferential judicial review.152
In addition, alternative plans are not required to adhere to the traditional Act’s provisions
on “medical management.”153 This exemption apparently refers to the traditional Act’s
requirement that an injured worker be afforded a right to choose his or her own doctor.154 As
observers of injury law are aware, parties to many contested cases provide fact finders with
medical opinions that are diametrically opposed on, for example, the cause and duration of a
claimant’s disability.155 Presumably under an alternative benefit plan, an employer would have
discretion as to whether to pay for the services or to accept into evidence the medical opinion of
a claimant’s treating doctor. Thus, an employer is in a position to send an injured worker to his
preferred physician and the issue of dueling doctors or independent medical examiners becomes
extinguished.156
Paragraph C. of the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act states:
The benefit plan may provide for lump-sum payouts that are, as reasonably
determined by the administrator of such plan appointed by the qualified employer,
actuarially equivalent to expected future payments. The benefit plan may also
provide for settlement agreements; provided, however, any settlement agreement
by a covered employee shall be voluntary, entered into not earlier than the tenth
business day after the date of the initial report of injury, and signed after the
covered employee has received a medical evaluation from a nonemergency care
doctor, with any waiver of rights being conspicuous and on the face of the
agreement. The benefit plan shall pay benefits without regard to whether the
covered employee, the qualified employer, or a third party caused the
occupational injury; and provided further, that the benefit plan shall provide
eligibility to participate in and provide the same forms and levels of benefits to all
Oklahoma employees of the qualified employer. The Administrative Workers’
Compensation Act shall not define, restrict, expand or otherwise apply to a benefit
plan.157
In other words, an administrator appointed solely by the employer determines whether
the employee’s lump sum payments are “actuarially equivalent” to future benefits. The
provision affords no limitations on the selection or qualifications of the administrator. Such a
determination would typically involve a cautious exercise of judgment in making accurate
assessments of the expected lifetime value of a claim, and again in calculating the present value
of that claim.158 These determinations can be complex and subject to dispute.159 Additionally,
the text of the provision gives no indication that, subsequent to execution of the agreement, the
settlement must be approved by a public official, or that an aggrieved injured worker could
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obtain judicial review of the agreement. Furthermore, a plan may authorize settlement
agreements and waivers as early as ten business days after an injury,160 when the magnitude of
an injury may still not be fully known. This presents problems similar to pre-injury waivers of
injury. While waivers must be conspicuous, nothing in the provision requires that waivers be
knowing or intelligent.161 An employee might easily sign away all rights before becoming aware
of the magnitude of an injury and, therefore, will have limited access to judicial review
thereafter.162
To say that a system like Oklahoma’s might provoke legal challenge is an
understatement. To say that the Oklahoma system might get “bad press” is obvious. However, it
remains true that the Oklahoma legislature enacted the system, and courts do not lightly set aside
the acts of legislatures.163 Further, the system is not irrational if the measure of rationality is
saving businesses money. However, if the rights being displaced by the Employee Injury Benefit
Act are fundamental, or even “very important,” such that the level of scrutiny applied by courts
is higher than that applied when reviewing merely economic regulation,164 the Oklahoma system
may continue to be quite vulnerable to legal attack because of the high risk that, through its
operation, injured workers will be deprived of reasonable remedies.165
C. Florida
In some states, critics have alleged that the incremental erosion of workers’ compensation
benefits has resulted in abandonment of the workers’ compensation quid pro quo or grant
bargain.166 In those states, legislatures have significantly scaled back the amount or duration of
indemnity benefits and limited medical treatment of work-related injuries.167 In these erosional
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Since [1972], changes in reductions in State workers’ compensation laws have increased the
inadequacy and inequitable levels of workers’ compensation benefits. Serious questions exist
concerning the fairness and adequacy of present workers’ compensation laws in light of the
growth of the economy, changing nature of the labor force, misclassification of workers as
independent contractors, and as leased employees, as well as erosion of remedies for the bad faith
handling and delay in payment of benefits and medical care to workers and their families,
increases in medical knowledge, changes in the hazards associated with various employment, new
risks to health and safety created by new technology, and increases in the general level of wages
and in the cost of living.
National Commission on State Workers’ Compensation Laws Act of 2009, H.R. 635, 11th Cong. § 2(3) (2009).
Recently, stories in the popular press have been arguing the same point:
Since 2003, legislators in 33 states have passed workers’ comp laws that reduce benefits or make
it more difficult for those with certain injuries and diseases to qualify for them. Florida has cut
benefits to its most severely disabled workers by 65 percent since 1994. . . . Many states have not
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contexts it has been argued that the societal deal originally struck in the quid pro quo of workers’
compensation has been breached.168 Conceptually, the theory is challenged by attempting to
establish the point at which reductions in benefits have effectively eliminated the workers’
compensation bargain.
Unlike opt-out, systems that are gradually reducing benefits do not face the critique that
they have suddenly eliminated workers’ compensation rights without any legal guarantee of a
“reasonably justified substitute.”169 Of course, those complaining of incremental erosion may
suspect legislative motives of eventual elimination of all remedies, but it is usually a conceptual
leap to convince appellate courts to expand challenges to that extent. One significant historical
complication of the erosional argument is that very early versions of workers’ compensation
statutes provided benefits that were at times substantially less generous than those contained in
modern workers’ compensation statutes.170 As a practical matter, from the very start of workers’
compensation, benefits varied widely by state and according to historical economic
circumstances.171 This is conceptually problematic for challengers because it makes it difficult
to establish a uniform baseline against which to measure “the grand bargain.”
A case recently litigated in Florida provides an excellent example of an incremental
reductionist claim. In Padgett v. State of Florida,172 a plaintiff challenged the unfolding of the
2003 revisions to Florida’s workers’ compensation statute.173 Plaintiff challenged the
requirement that injured workers in some instances be responsible for payment of medical
treatment necessitated by their work-related injuries,174 an obligation that is at odds with core
only shrunk the payments to injured workers; they’ve also cut them off after an arbitrary time
limit—even if workers haven’t recovered.
Howard Berkes, Injured Workers Suffer as ‘Reforms’ Limit Workers’ Compensation Benefits, NPR (Mar. 4, 2015),
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understandings of the nature of workers’ compensation.175 Another major challenge raised was
to the 2003 elimination of wage loss benefits for partial incapacity.176
Padgett commenced when an injured worker sued his employer for negligence.177 The
employer raised the defense of exclusive remedy immunity of the Florida Workers’
Compensation Act.178 In response, the plaintiff amended his complaint, seeking a declaration
that the exclusive remedy immunity was both invalid and violated due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the open courts, and under provisions of the
Florida Constitution.179 The employer withdrew its exclusive remedy defense, and the court
severed it as a party from the declaratory relief portion of the complaint.180 The employer’s exit
from the case called into question the existence of a reviewable controversy on standing
grounds,181 an issue that would essentially result in the case’s dismissal.182 Reviewability
appeared preliminarily to be restored when Padgett, a “concrete” workers’ compensation
beneficiary allegedly harmed by the statute, was allowed to intervene.183
Understanding the Padgett context requires some work. In 1968, Florida revised its
Constitution and Declaration of Rights.184 At the time of the revision, the Florida Workers’
Compensation Act provided full payment for medical treatment and weekly indemnity benefits
for partially disabled workers.185 In 1970, the legislature amended the Act to, among other
things, prevent injured workers from opting out of workers’ compensation and suing in tort,186
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Id. at 3.
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than 3 years after the injury date.
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which, up until that time, had been authorized.187 No increased benefits were afforded to
workers in exchange for relinquishing their right to sue.188 In 1973, Florida became a
comparative (as opposed to a contributory) negligence state.189 As a result, plaintiffs could not
be absolutely barred from receiving a tort remedy if they “in any appreciable way contributed to
the proximate cause of the injury.”190 Accordingly, stripping workers of the right to sue became
a different proposition under tort law, because tort plaintiffs had become eligible to recover
damages on a comparative negligence theory, making recovery more likely than it had been in
1970.191 In 2000, the Florida legislature suspended injured workers’ entitlement to partial
incapacity indemnity benefits.192 The Act, as amended in 2003,193 required—for the first time—
that injured workers pay a portion of medical treatment costs related to their work-related
injuries once these workers reached “maximum medical improvement.”194
Given these developments, the trial court in Padgett concluded that the quid pro quo of
tort for workers’ compensation was no longer adequate.195 The court opined that partial
incapacity attributable to an employer’s negligence in causing a work-related injury would have
been fully compensable in negligence prior to the creation of the workers’ compensation remedy,
as would medical treatment made necessary by such tortious conduct.196 Further, the exclusive
remedy rule reduced aggregate liability for employers,197 but because of the reduction in
workers’ compensation benefits there was no longer a truly correlative benefit for workers.198
Thus, the nature of the quid pro quo changed.199 The court appeared to have accepted the
187
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argument that workers were forced to give up more to participate in the workers’ compensation
system than had been the case prior to 1970 as a result of losing the right to sue.200
The unified narrative from Padgett provides that, at the time of the creation of the Florida
exclusive remedy rule in 1935,201 workers were arguably satisfied with the quid pro quo because
of the toll that the affirmative defense of contributory negligence took on common law
negligence suits.202 However, Florida’s replacement of contributory negligence with
comparative negligence203 meant that, if negligence could be established, workers were much
more likely to enjoy some recovery in tort. To the extent recovery would exceed the typical
workers’ compensation remedy of two-thirds of the average weekly wage at the time of the
injury,204 workers would prefer the negligence recovery. Furthermore, a worker partially
incapacitated or disabled and suffering only a partial wage loss as a result of her employer’s
negligence might be entitled to complete recovery of that wage loss in tort,205 but not in workers’
compensation.206 Similarly, an injured worker might be able to achieve in tort complete recovery
for medical expenses related to a work injury,207 while under the present workers’ compensation
system in Florida there is a chance for less-than-full recovery for medical treatment required by a
work-related injury.208 The legal baseline inherent in the quid pro quo has changed. The
rhetorical question posed is whether a hypothetical worker in the “original position” during the
inception of workers’ compensation would agree to this version of the grand bargain.209 The
argument might continue that the absence of worker premiums for changes in tort law amounted
to a windfall for employers.210 Under these circumstances, maintaining the exclusive remedy
rule is no longer supportable.211
Florida courts faced similar arguments in recent years, but in slightly different contexts.
For example, in Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg,212 a Florida appellate court was faced with an
interpretation of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act that effectively left certain
classification of totally incapacitated workers without any remedy for workplace injury. 213 In
Westphal, workers with temporary total disability for the maximum statutory period for
entitlement to benefits had not yet been found to have reached maximum medical
improvement214—a condition precedent for transitioning from temporary to permanent
benefits.215 Thus, their entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits simply expired, even
though they continued to be totally disabled as a factual matter.216 Accordingly, an
200
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uncompensated “gap” was created between the time of the temporary total disability expiration
and the point at which they were eventually able to reestablish entitlement to total permanent
benefits.217 While the court did not explicitly discuss quid pro quo, it did observe that:
[A]n interpretation that would create a potential gap in disability benefits could
result in an uncorrectable error. If the claim is denied because the disabled
worker may still improve and it turns out later that he or she does not improve, the
logical inference would be that the worker had, in fact, reached maximum medical
improvement earlier. Yet there is nothing in the law that would enable the worker
to recover the disability benefits he or she should have been receiving in the
meantime. It is reasonable to conclude that, if the Legislature had intended to
create a gap in the payment of disability benefits, it would have at least provided a
remedy for the recovery of lost benefits if it could be shown later that the claimant
was actually at maximum medical improvement all along and should have been
receiving those benefits. . . . [W]e have never before been confronted with a
constitutional challenge to the statutes in question. Such a question was not
presented . . . in any other previous case presented to the court. It is safe to say
that the prospect of declaring the statute unconstitutional put the issue in an
entirely new light.218
The strong implication was that workers left with no recovery might have a basis for a
constitutional challenge premised on the lack of any remedy for injury.219 In Padgett, the trial
court relied heavily on the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Martinez v. Scanlan.220 There,
the court rejected a quid pro quo argument raised by Scanlan, who had challenged the 1990
workers’ compensation statutory amendments on a variety of theories.221 With respect to a
challenge premised on breach of quid pro quo, the court said:
Although chapter 90-201 undoubtedly reduces benefits to eligible workers, the
workers’ compensation law remains a reasonable alternative to tort litigation. It
continues to provide injured workers with full medical care and wage-loss
payments for total or partial disability regardless of fault and without the delay
and uncertainty of tort litigation. Furthermore, while there are situations where an
employee would be eligible for benefits under the pre-1990 workers’
compensation law and now, as a result of chapter 90-201, is no longer eligible,
that employee is not without a remedy. There still may remain the viable
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alternative of tort litigation in these instances. As to this attack, the statute passes
constitutional muster.222
With respect to the language in Martinez (contentions that the trial judge accepted), the
plaintiff and Padgett argued that recent developments had undercut Martinez’s rationale as to
workers’ compensation as a reasonable alternative to tort litigation.223 After 2003, workers’
compensation in Florida no longer provided injured workers with full medical care in some
cases, or with any wage loss compensation for partial disability.224 The plaintiff next argued
that, in light of the benefit reductions, injured workers are now authorized to proceed in tort.225
The important conceptual point made in Padgett, a point that was established implicitly by
Martinez, is that the level and duration of benefits could be subject to scrutiny for adequacy to
ensure the statute continued to pass constitutional muster under the Florida Constitution.226
Martinez essentially opened the door for Padgett and for future cases premised on continued
benefit adequacy.
The Florida incremental erosion cases are driven by the unique history and structure of
the Florida Constitution. A number of states possess constitutions containing language requiring
“open courts,”227 and Florida is no exception. Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution
states that “[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall
be administered without sale, denial or delay.”228 This language may suggest that there must be
at least some substantive remedy for injury, and cases such as Westphal, raising scenarios in
which workers might be left with no remedy,229 become problematic under such an
interpretation. However, not every state with an open courts provision has read a substantive
right to a remedy into the provision.230
A second potent, anti-erosional feature of Florida law was showcased in Kluger v.
White.231 There, the Florida Supreme Court considered a law providing that tort actions in
connection with automobile accidents were completely abolished where a putative plaintiff
carried automobile insurance or where a plaintiff without insurance suffered damages of less
than $550.232 In Kluger, because the fair market value of the plaintiff’s damaged automobile was
$250, she could receive no more than that amount under Florida law.233 Because she also carried
no insurance, the plaintiff was effectively without a remedy for damages.234 The court held that
this abolishment of the remedy violated the Florida open courts provision.235 In support of its
conclusion, the court first noted that it “ha[d] never before specifically spoken to the issue of
whether or not the constitutional guarantee of a ‘redress of any injury’ . . . bars the statutory
abolition of an existing remedy without providing an alternative protection to the injured
222
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party.”236 Noting that Florida’s Declaration of Human Rights had previously been found binding
on the legislature,237 the court recited the following language from the Corpus Juris Secundum:
A constitutional provision insuring a certain remedy for all injuries or wrongs
does not command continuation of a specific statutory remedy. However, in a
jurisdiction wherein the constitutional guaranty applies to the legislature as well
as to the judiciary . . . it has been held that the guaranty precludes the repeal of a
statute allowing a remedy where the statute was in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. Furthermore . . . the guaranty also prevents, in some
jurisdictions, the total abolition of a common-law remedy.238
Because the right to a tort recovery for the type of automobile accident suffered by the
plaintiff existed prior to the adoption of the 1968 iteration of the Florida Constitution,239 the
court deemed it “essential . . . that this Court consider whether or not the Legislature is, in fact,
empowered to abolish a common law and statutory right of action without providing an adequate
alternative.”240 The court then went on to announce principles that are germane to the workers’
compensation discussion:
Upon careful consideration of the requirements of society, and the ever-evolving
character of the law, we cannot adopt a complete prohibition against such
legislative change. Nor can we adopt a view which would allow the Legislature
to destroy a traditional and long-standing cause of action upon mere legislative
whim, or when an alternative approach is available. . . . We hold, therefore, that
where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been
provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of
the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of
the common law of the State . . . the Legislature is without power to abolish such
a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the
people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an
overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no
alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.241
Thus, as the argument goes in Padgett, because the workers’ compensation quid pro quo
pre-dated the 1968 constitution, the court must “not allow the Legislature to destroy a traditional
and long-standing cause of action upon mere legislative whim, or when an alternative approach
is available.”242 Further, workers’ compensation may not be abolished “unless the Legislature
can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative
method for meeting such public necessity can be shown.”243 The rejoinder to the argument is
that an amendment to the workers’ compensation statute is not an abolishment. However, this
236
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begs the question of how far a statute can be amended before it ceases to retain its essential
character.
The peculiar character of Florida’s constitution, therefore, makes it uniquely possible to
argue that workers’ compensation benefits—as a substitute for a longstanding tort remedy—may
not be abolished without providing a reasonable alternative absent an “overpowering public
necessity.”244 Other state courts may of course be less inclined to place their thumbs on the scale
of “reasonable” alternatives when interpreting legislative modifications of workers’
compensation statutes.245
D. Concluding Thoughts on State-Specific Contexts
Whether authorizing opt-out, as in Texas and Oklahoma,246 or enacting incrementalerosional changes in medical and permanent partial incapacity benefits, as in Florida,247 states
can anticipate pushback by plaintiffs to workers’ compensation benefit reduction. Because of the
multijurisdictional character of workers’ compensation law, both statutory modification and
opposition to change can take on a peculiarly local character, as they have in the three states
discussed in this Part. Nevertheless, workers’ compensation law, despite being formally multistate in character, was originally instituted as a sweeping national phenomenon.
Between 1910 and 1920, forty-three states enacted workers’ compensation statutes,248 a
rate of implementation that would be the envy of many federal statutes.249 With current total
national workers’ compensation expenditures at just under 60 billion dollars per year,250
plaintiffs and defendants in various statutes possess large incentives both to oppose and to
support modifications to workers’ compensation law, and, in accordance with history, to move
quickly. The remainder of this article sketches the probable contours of legal argument
surrounding proposed changes to traditional workers’ compensation statutes, premised on both
state and federal constitutional law. These arguments—which apply equally in other tort reform
contexts—will likely test the limits of legislative hegemony in the realm of personal injury rights
and remedies, and plaintiffs will seek to develop a framework of “rights” which may not be
dispossessed lightly.251 Part IV, infra, discusses state constitutional theories germane to the
restraint of state legislatures seeking to reform personal injury law.
IV.

STATE RESTRAINT: OPEN COURTS, RIGHT TO A REMEDY, QUID PRO QUO

Challenges to significant changes in workers’ compensation law are akin to even broader
challenges to tort reform seeking to reduce plaintiff remedies. Because workers’ compensation
was the personal injury substitute for tort,252 significant incursions on workers’ compensation
should be seen in the same way as interference with tort. Assuming a court were to accept this
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premise, the next question centers on the importance of the tort right, or, of a right to remedy for
personal injury generally.
The underlying question is whether a right to a remedy for personal injury—whether in
tort or workers’ compensation—is of more than ordinary importance and whether that right’s
diminution by a legislature is sufficient to generate heightened judicial scrutiny. Arguments that
a right to a remedy for personal injury should be treated as possessing such importance has
received vague support at the federal level.253 At the state level, however, plaintiffs have
occasionally made headway by arguing that significant reduction or elimination of injury
damages should be evaluated by the judiciary with heightened scrutiny because the rights in
question are at least important under a state’s constitution.254 One variation of the argument is
that benefit reductions result in inadequate or unreasonably low compensation,255 effecting a
breach in the original “grand bargain” or quid pro quo in which workers surrendered their tort
rights for reasonable alternative compensation.256 Another variation of state constitutional
argument centers on “right to a remedy” provisions.257 As will be discussed in more detail
below,258 quid pro quo and “right to a remedy” theories are closely related. Implicit in the
concept of quid pro quo is the idea that it would be impermissible to extinguish one right of the
involved kind without replacing it with another similar right because the original right was
important.259
Of course, plaintiffs have challenged limitations on tort remedies on several other state
constitutional theories, including the denial of the right to a jury trial,260 and under provisions
that prohibit special legislation261 and require separation of governmental powers.262 This
Article addresses each of these theories, but will focus on challenges centered on right to a
remedy and open courts, the quid pro quo category of due process, and state constitutional equal
protection.
A. Right to a Remedy and Open Courts
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“Right to a remedy” language is often located in the “open courts” provision of state
constitutions263 and has sometimes been interpreted as ensuring a substantive remedy to litigants,
rather than merely guaranteeing that courthouse doors will remain open to citizens.264 Right to a
remedy and open court provisions have ancient roots in the Magna Carta.265 The current right to
a remedy and open courts provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution, for example, is a remnant
of the ancient language:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.266
The ancient language itself read:
[E]very subject of this realme, for injury done to him . . . by any other subject . . .
without exception, may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have
justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any
denial, and speedily without delay.267
Some state courts have concluded, primarily in the context of litigation over tort or
medical malpractice reform,268 that the right to remedy and open courts language in their
constitutions means that citizens should have a right to an adequate substantive remedy.269 Some
open courts provisions explicitly include the phrase “right to a remedy,”270 but there are also
variations to this language.271 As already noted,272 Florida’s courts have decided that Florida’s
open courts provision establishes a doctrine of quid pro quo, a requirement that “vested” rights
may not be modified unless a reasonable remedy is substituted for them.273 Because some states
afford citizens the practical equivalent of vested rights to remedies, some notable commentators
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have opined that individual rights are, at times, better protected by state constitutions than by
their federal counterpart.274
“Right to a remedy” and open courts arguments were featured prominently in Smothers v.
Gresham Transfer, Inc.275 In the case, a truck shop lube technician alleged that his employer
“negligently allowed acid laden mist and fumes to drift into the shop area where [he] worked,
causing harm to his respiratory system, skin, teeth, and joints.”276 The technician filed a
workers’ compensation claim, which was denied by his employer’s insurance carrier.277
Ultimately the Workers’ Compensation Board of the State of Oregon upheld the denial,278
finding that the technician’s work was not the “major contributing cause of his injuries”279 and
that he did not have “compensable injury” under the workers’ compensation statute.280
Additionally, the technician could not bring a tort suit because of the exclusive remedy rule, and
the trial court dismissed his complaint when he tried to do so.281 Thus, the technician in
Smothers was in the same position as the Florida plaintiffs in Westphal and Kluger. Each of
these plaintiffs was completely cut off from any remedy for personal injury,282 in a sense of
conceptually easier scenario than one in which the “adequacy” of a remedy is under dispute.283
On appeal, the technician in Smothers argued that the court’s application of the Oregon
exclusive remedy rule violated, among other things, the remedy clause of the Oregon
Constitution.284 The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the argument, stating:
The question in this case is whether the legislature, when it amended [the
exclusive remedy rule], intended to declare that a work-related harm that is
outside the definition of “compensable injury” in [the workers’ compensation
statute] is not a “legally cognizable” injury. If that was its intention, then there is
no “right” on which a “deprivation of a remedy” argument could be predicated.285
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The appellate court’s response went directly to the heart of the matter: the only “rights”
in question were statutory workers’ compensation and tort rights,286 and, if the legislature wanted
to extinguish either or both sets of rights, it had plenary power to do so.287 While it could not, of
course, create a right and then deny a remedy,288 this was not the situation. While there may be
no right without a remedy, there is also no remedy without a right.289
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision in Smothers290 in the
only way logically possible. The court found the existence of a substantive right in the remedies
clause of the state constitution291 and drew on a great deal of history in doing so.292 The
argument has been that Magna Carta and the history of open courts and remedies provisions293
did not appear out of thin air. As Thomas Phillips wrote, one of the most widespread and
important of state constitutional provisions is the “right of access to the courts to obtain a remedy
for injury.”294 The right to a remedy for injury derives from Magna Carta,295 and the seventeenth
century articulation of it from Lord Coke may be found in the constitutions of eleven states.296
The Oregon Supreme Court, as well as numerous scholars, have traced a taxonomy of
rights—that would have been familiar to the founders, adopters of the early remedy
provisions297—to Blackstone’s Commentaries,298 in which the rights of persons at common law
were divided into “absolute” and “relative” rights.299 Among the absolute rights were those of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.300 Absolute rights, according to
Blackstone, could not be protected simply by declaring them; they had to be subject to
vindication.301 The “right to a remedy” was one of five subordinate rights allowing vindication
of absolute rights.302 Once a person suffered injury to one of those rights, an “adequate remedy”
automatically attached.303
The Blackstone formulation was not conceived as a “due process” protection because the
threat of encroachment on rights arose from the Crown and from private actors, not from the
legislature.304 Nevertheless, the right to a remedy existed within Blackstone’s “natural law”
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rights taxonomy.305 Phillips has argued persuasively that early-American tort cases were
consistent with Blackstone’s absolute-relative right model:
In most early American cases, the courts were willing to supply a remedy for
every right, whether created by common law or statute. But they were not bound
to preserve any particular remedy or procedure for vindicating the right. As long
as the new law preserved the injured person’s ability to vindicate his or her rights
in court or provided an adequate substitute remedy, the right to a remedy was not
violated. The courts also allowed legislatures to limit remedies derived from
relative law, such as respondeat superior, in part because the injured person
retained the right to obtain a judicial remedy against the individual who caused
the injury, that is, the individual who violated the injured person’s absolute right
to personal security.306
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Smothers followed a similar line of reasoning.307 It was
the business of the court to trace the “right to a remedy” clause from its apparent origins in
Magna Carta, through Lord Coke, William Blackstone, the early colonists, the Founders, and
ultimately, back to the Oregon Constitution.308 It is a long story,309 at the culmination of which
the court concluded:
As we have explained, the history of the remedy clause indicates that its purpose
is to protect absolute common-law rights respecting person, property, and
reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon Constitution was drafted in
1857. The means for protecting those rights is the mandate that remedy by due
course of law be available in the event of injury.310
From that resolution, it was a short step for the court to conclude that Smothers had been
deprived of his remedy.311 Then, the court conceptually went one step further: not only was it
impermissible to deprive a citizen of a remedy, it was equally impermissible to deprive him of a
plainly inadequate remedy.312 The court acknowledged the right of the legislature to alter law,
but imposed a limitation:
Although this court has held that the remedy clause preserves common-law rights
of action, it never has held that the remedy clause prohibits the legislature from
changing a common-law remedy or form of procedure, attaching conditions
precedent to invoking the remedy, or perhaps even abolishing old remedies and
utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.”).
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substituting new remedies. That is, the court never has held that the remedy
clause freezes in place common-law remedies. However, just as the legislature
cannot deny a remedy entirely for injury to constitutionally protected commonlaw rights, neither can it substitute an “emasculated remedy” that is incapable of
restoring the right that has been injured.313
This line of thought reveals a conceptual linchpin between right to a remedy and quid pro
quo. The remedy may be altered—adjusted for historical circumstances—but the right may not
be annihilated, for it is absolute.314 Many courts have refined or disagreed with this line of
reasoning. As Jennifer Friesen has explained:
At least three theoretical positions can be discerned from the various “tests”
announced: the historically tied approach, the “reasonable alternative” public
policy approach, and the legislative power approach. The historically tied
approach holds that the [open courts and remedies] clauses protect only common
law causes of action that existed at the time of the adoption of the constitutional
clause, which are preserved unless the legislature substitutes another adequate
remedy or “quid pro quo” for the affected litigants. The public policy approach
permits the legislature to limit any cause of action and remedy if it creates a
reasonable alternative, but, even without creating a substitute, it may alter former
rights if it acts for a very important reason or is responding to an overwhelming
public need. The third theory allows legislatures the broadest power to alter
common law rights and remedies by redefining the notion of legal injury.315
Utilization of this rubric reveals opinions form Florida and Oregon already discussed as
undertaking primarily “historically-tied approaches.”316 Challenges to opt-out and significant
incremental-erosional modifications to workers’ compensation statutes would likely have the
greatest success in those jurisdictions in which courts have been sympathetic to such historical
arguments within tort reform contexts. Smothers, for example, utilized a historically-tied
approach to both presume that the essence of a common law right to a remedy must be preserved
and to insist that any substitute remedy be adequate.317
The “public policy” approach may also be useful to opponents of opt-out and
incremental-erosional workers’ compensation modifications, because it requires that remedial
substitutes for rights be “reasonable.”318 However, this approach leaves open the possibility that
substitution may lawfully be “unreasonable” when the legislature is acting for an important
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reason or responding to an overwhelming public need.319 The question in these situations may
be whether the burden is on the government to demonstrate the existence or severity of the public
need. Finally, if a jurisdiction’s courts utilize the “legislative power” approach, it does not
appear that adequacy or reasonableness will enter into those courts’ analyses.320
Nevertheless, in all but legislative power jurisdictions, it would seem likely that opt-out
challengers prefer development of a historically-tied narrative. As Professor John Bauman
argued, states in which this approach is undertaken are, in reality:
[S]ubjecting the statute to a form of substantive due process review. In
substantive due process review, the court scrutinizes both the goal of the
legislation, to determine whether the statute deals with a matter of legitimate (or
even compelling) government interest, and then tests whether the means chosen
are properly related to achieving that goal.321
It is likely true, as Professor Bauman has also observed, that “[t]he common law is not
divine revelation, but rather a human artifact consciously chosen”322 and that “it is hard to decide
exactly what ‘common law’ is made fundamental by the [remedy] provision.”323 However,
courts using historically-tied approaches to remedies provisions appear to be employing a kind of
originalism in discerning state-based absolute rights in the Blackstonian tradition. They are in a
historical “construction zone” and arrive at such a point because “[c]onstruction becomes the
focus of explicit attention when the meaning of the constitutional text is unclear, or the
implications of that meaning are contested.”324 Within that construction zone, the historical
peculiarities of states are of significance and have predictably been creatively exploited. One
imagines this venture will continue, particularly as scholarship matures on the origins of the
“right to a remedy” and open courts provisions.
Theories of legislative supremacy, on the other hand, challenge historically-tied attempts
to ward off tort reform.325 These theories hold that the authority of the legislature should govern
absolutely in all areas not explicitly closed off by constitutional guarantee.326 In a legislative
supremacy environment, no personal injury litigant will get anywhere unless persuading a court
of explicit guarantees of remedies for personal injury,327 which will not exist. In Meech v.
Hillhaven West,328 for example, the plaintiff sought damages for wrongful termination, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, for allegedly oppressive, malicious, unjustifiable conduct by his employer,
and ultimately for wrongful discharge.329 Montana had enacted the Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act,330 which, by its terms, “preempted” common law remedies.331 The plaintiff in
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Meech challenged the statutory preemption of his tort claims on several grounds, including those
under Montana’s unified constitutional “right to a remedy” and “open courts” provision.332 The
Montana Supreme Court rejected the argument out of hand:
The legislature’s exercise of its power to alter the common law supports in a large
part our legal system. . . . [M]uch of the legislation altering the common law
concerns the legislature’s decisions on the remedies, redress, or damages
obtainable in carious causes of action. . . . Legislative decisions to expand liability
to further various policy objectives are debated and passed almost routinely . . .
for a variety of policy reasons, refuses to provide a cause of action, remedy and
redress for every injury. This proposition is expressed in Latin as damnum
absque injuria, meaning a “loss which does not give rise to an action for damages
against the person causing it.” The legislation at issue here similarly alters
common-law rights and duties and arguably denies a cause of action, remedy, and
redress for injuries recognized at common law. If Article II, § 16, guarantees a
fundamental right to full legal redress as embodied in common-law causes of
action, then a myriad of legislation altering common law in a restrictive manner,
as well as the Act, denies this fundamental right.333
This is a robust statement of legislative supremacy. Essentially, the court held that,
assuming the underlying substantive tort right is, or might at one time have been, considered
“fundamental,” the legislature nevertheless had plenary authority to abolish it.334 Under this
view, no right is absolute.
Of course, courts need not—and at times have not—conceded that open courts or
remedies provisions have any substantive component at all. It is worth noting that Oklahoma
itself does not view the remedies clause as providing substance, so opt-out challengers there may
find little solace in proceeding on such a theory. In Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co.,335 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in connection with the state constitutional remedy provision, stated:
That this was a mandate to the judiciary and was not intended as a limitation upon
the legislative branch of the government seems clear. Neither do we think it was
intended to preserve a particular remedy for given causes of action in any certain
court of the state, nor was it intended to deprive the Legislature of the power to
abolish remedies for future accruing causes of action (where not otherwise
specifically prohibited), or to create new remedies for other wrongs as in its
wisdom it might determine.336
A number of states see matters in much the same way.337 And, whether the remedies
provision may be used to imply a substantive personal injury right of redress requires a state-bystate assessment.
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B.

State Quid Pro Quo

Quid pro quo is essentially a due process concept.338 Therefore, this article will address
the theory in that manner, reserving traditional due process analysis for the next Part on federal
theories of restraint.339 In the federal context, it may be worth noting that the Supreme Court
implicitly created quid pro quo as a matter of federal due process in White and failed to reject the
theory in the case of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group.340
Some states have adopted and developed the quid pro quo theory341—that remedy for
loss of an “important” common law right may not be dissolved by a legislature without provision
of an adequate substitute,342 which may take on different forms. In Kansas Malpractice Victims
Coalition v. Bell,343 for example, the plaintiffs challenged medical malpractice caps and a
requirement that they take future damages over time in the form of an annuity.344 Setting its
mood point in prefatory language, the court said:
The Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution and the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution are there to protect every citizen, including a person who has
no clout, and the little guy on the block. They are there to protect the rights of a
brain-damaged baby, a quadriplegic farmer or business executive, and a horribly
disfigured housewife who is a victim of medical malpractice. They are not there
to see that the will of the majority is carried out, but to protect the rights of the
minority. It is the obligation of this court in each case to carry out its
constitutional responsibility. With that obligation in mind, we now turn to the
issues involved in the case now before us.345
Tracing a long line of Kansas cases,346 the court set out a two-step analysis in which it
first determined whether the plaintiff’s right to a remedy had been limited.347 Then, finding that
it had been limited,348 the court moved on to assess whether the plaintiff had, notwithstanding the
limitation, received from the legislature an adequate substitution remedy.349 The court found that
he had not.350
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In Texas Workers’ Compensation v. Garcia,351 the Texas Supreme Court considered a
broad attack on the constitutionality of the 1989 amendment of the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act.352 Various plaintiffs alleged that “provisions of the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act facially violate[d] the Texas Constitution’s guarantees of open courts, due
course of law, equal protection, jury trial, and obligation of contract.”353 The lower courts
sustained a majority of the challenges and struck the Texas Act.354 The Texas Supreme Court
reversed, but importantly, accepted the premise that any modification of the workers’
compensation statute had to be reasonable in substituting statutory for common law remedies:
[L]egislative action withdrawing common-law remedies for well-established
common-law causes of action for injuries to one’s “lands, goods, person or
reputation” is sustained only when it is reasonable in substituting other remedies,
or when it is a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of the
general welfare.355
The court concluded that it “must compare the current statute to the common law remedy,
not to the previous statute. The open courts provision guarantees that a common law remedy
will not be unreasonably abridged, not that the Legislature will not amend or replace a
statute.”356 Thus, the court agreed on the critical quid pro quo point. However, the court
nevertheless upheld the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act under the essential open courts
challenge.357 The gravamen of the court’s argument was that in a majority of cases—even under
modern negligence doctrine—injured workers could easily fail to prevail in negligence cases and
the record in the current case suggested to the court that workers would recover nothing in
negligence in a large majority of cases:
Although the Legislature has softened the defense of contributory negligence by
adopting comparative responsibility, and this Court has abolished the defense of
assumption of the risk, an injured employee pursuing the common law remedy
must still prove that the employer was negligent and that he or she was not more
than 50 percent negligent. Although the trial court made no finding on the issue,
there was evidence at trial that, even with these changes in the common law,
injured employees pursuing negligence claims against their employers recover
nothing in a large majority of cases. In comparison, the Act—carrying forward
the general scheme of the former act—provides benefits to injured workers
without the necessity of proving negligence and without regard to the employer’s
potential defenses. In exchange, the benefits are more limited than the actual
damages recoverable at common law. We believe this quid pro quo, which
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produces a more limited but more certain recovery, renders the Act an adequate
substitute for purposes of the open courts guarantee.358
This contention by the court nicely underscores the dilemma faced by injured workers’
advocates advancing quid pro quo arguments. A court may conclude that the remedy for a quid
pro quo “gone bad” is to return to the negligence status quo ante. In fact, this was precisely the
conclusion reached by the Florida trial judge in Padgett.359 However, if the court in Garcia is
correct, returning to the status quo ante might not be a good thing for plaintiffs. Ultimately, the
Garcia court’s argument likely proves too much. Employers and their insurance carriers, having
had the benefit of much more employer-friendly tort laws in the early twentieth century, were
sufficiently concerned about the prospect of successful employee negligence suits to become
proponents of workers’ compensation laws.360 It seems difficult to suggest that negligence law is
better for employers now than it was in 1910. Though plaintiffs may experience significant
difficulty in making out negligence claims, employers continue to be liable for possibly crippling
damage claims, only one of which may be sufficient for an employer to redevelop a preference
for insurance premiums. Nevertheless, while the plaintiffs in Garcia may have lost the tactical
contest they may have won a strategic victory. Time will tell.361
Taking a different approach from the Texas court in Garcia, on the other hand, the
California Supreme Court, in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,362 appeared to doubt the
independent existence under due process of a quid pro quo requirement.363 In Fein, an attorney
who was suffering from a heart attack had been misdiagnosed on several occasions as
experiencing only muscle spasms.364 The attorney, who suffered harm from the misdiagnosis,
sued in tort.365 The attorney prevailed at trial, but, under a tort reform statute, was limited to
noneconomic damages of $250,000.366 The California Supreme Court rejected several
challenges to this limitation, concluding that the legislature’s decision to limit noneconomic
liability was not irrational.367 In a footnote to its decision, the Court suggested both that a quid
pro quo theory was not applicable to its analysis and that its application to the case would not
have changed the outcome.368 “Indeed, even if due process principles required some ‘quid pro
quo’ to support the statute, it would be difficult to say that the preservation of a viable medical
malpractice insurance industry in this state was not an adequate benefit for the detriment the
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legislation imposes on malpractice plaintiffs.”369 This statement exemplifies a “societal quid pro
quo” argument: although the individual plaintiff may suffer, society as a whole, and, perhaps the
plaintiff in other circumstances, benefits.370 An illustrative societal quid pro quo argument is
that tort reform may lead to lower aggregate health care costs despite having an adverse impact
on an individual plaintiff in a particular case.371
Some courts, of course, reject quid pro quo unapologetically, holding that the common
law of England was “merely statutory” and thus modifiable at will by a legislature. 372 Where the
common law has not been supplanted by statute, some courts argue that reading the open courts
and remedy provisions as a limitation on legislative power would have the effect of reifying the
law as of the date of adoption of the provisions373 (some of which were not enacted until the
gilded age)374 and, one might note, at some distance from Coke, Blackstone, and Magna Carta.
These cases seem to assume that recognition of due process quid pro quo or a constitutional right
to a remedy for injury means that the legislature would be absolutely prevented from modifying
or abolishing a remedy. As Tracy Thomas argued: “As a fundamental right . . . the right to a
remedy can still be denied if that denial is necessary to a compelling state interest.”375
In sum, states vary significantly as to how or whether they recognize quid pro quo due
process, and it is difficult to formulate general, multistate conclusions about the viability of the
theory.
C. State Equal Protection
Another constitutional theory that opt-out challengers may attempt to utilize in
challenging severe limitations to personal injury remedies is equal protection. Most states follow
the federal courts’ approach to equal protection analysis.376 On the easiest rendering of federal
law, because the right to a recovery for physical injury has not been deemed fundamental, and
because physically injured workers or persons do not make up a traditional suspect or quasisuspect classification,377 state laws applicable to them are subject only to deferential rational
369
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basis review.378 The U.S. Supreme Court has directly addressed this rational basis review,
opining that “[i]n areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.”379 However, not all state courts take this path with
respect to interpretation of the equal protection provisions of their own constitutions.
In Carson v. Mauer,380 the New Hampshire Supreme Court took the view that “the right
to recover for personal injuries is . . . an important substantive right,”381 when it struck several
provisions of a medical malpractice statute.382 Among challenges to the statute was that it
violated equal protection under the state constitution.383 The court reaffirmed that, just as was
the case with federal court review of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, it
would not “[i]n the absence of a ‘suspect classification’ or a ‘fundamental right’ . . . secondguess the legislature as to the wisdom of or necessity for legislation.”384 Thus, the court accepted
the factual predicates upon which the legislature has concluded that medical malpractice reform
was necessary.385 The Carson court also acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court had applied
a “substantial relationship” test—a requirement that statutory classifications rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation—only
“to cases involving classifications based upon gender and illegitimacy.”386 Nevertheless, the
Carson court concluded:
Although the right to recover for personal injuries is not a “fundamental right,” it
is nevertheless an important substantive right. In Estate of Cargill v. City of
Rochester . . . we applied the rational basis test in evaluating classifications
which, like those in [the statutory provision under review], place restrictions on an
individual’s right to recover in tort. We now conclude, however, that the rights
color, previous condition of servitude, and sex. The version of equal protection incorporation that I favor would also
treat age discrimination as suspect, and might apply to some laws that disadvantage the poor as well. A remaining
question is whether adopting equal protection incorporation means that no categories beyond those expressly singled
out by the constitutional text are presumptively invalid.”)
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involved herein are sufficiently important to require that the restrictions imposed
on those rights be subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed
under the rational basis test.387
While the court recognized that it was applying a scrutiny exceeding that applied in
connection with Equal Protection review under the U.S. Constitution,388 the majority stated:
“[W]e are not confined to federal constitutional standards and are free to grant individuals more
rights than the Federal Constitution requires.”389 According to the court, the middle-level tier of
review under which encroachments on personal injury rights had to be assessed required that
legislation be “reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”390
Although Carson has subsequently been reversed on other grounds,391 the “important
substantive right” formulation continues to trigger intermediate scrutiny in New Hampshire. 392
Thus, legislative enactment of workers’ compensation opt-out, in conjunction with retaining the
exclusive remedy rule, would almost certainly face heightened judicial scrutiny in New
Hampshire by requiring the state government to justify the de facto elimination of the workers’
compensation remedy.
Not all state courts agree that the right to recover for personal injuries is sufficiently
important to trigger heightened scrutiny under the equal protection provisions of their state
constitutions when the right suffers interference. In Morris v. Savoy,393 for example, the Ohio
Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to a medical malpractice statute.394
Although it struck two of the challenged provisions on due process grounds,395 the court rejected
the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge.396 In the due process portion of its analysis, the court
held that the statute was “unconstitutional because it does not bear a real and substantial relation
to public health or welfare and further because it is unreasonable and arbitrary.”397 The court
nevertheless rejected the equal protection challenge because “the statute must be upheld if there
exists any conceivable set of facts under which the classification rationally furthered a legitimate
legislative objective.”398 These conclusions seem more than a little inconsistent. The Carson
court399 had also been willing to unflinchingly accept the legislative facts that surrounded the
involved statute’s enactment, as it simultaneously rejected as arbitrary the conclusions flowing
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from those facts.400 Apparently, irrational application of presumptively valid facts can provide
sufficient reason for rejecting legislative conclusions, but the principle is somewhat confounding.
Morris may be more indicative of how state courts are presently likely to analyze equal
protection challenges.401 In workers’ compensation contexts there have been few successful
equal protection challenges by plaintiffs or defendants.402 The reason for this is likely that the
public policy rationale at the time of the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes would
have survived what we now call strict scrutiny, let alone survive more deferential standards of
review.403 The major defect with respect to equal protection analysis is its all-or-nothing
character under either the strict scrutiny or rational basis tests. As Laurence Tribe has written in
explaining why some courts have taken the New Hampshire intermediate scrutiny approach
displayed in Carson:
[An] all-or-nothing choice between minimum rationality and strict scrutiny illsuits the broad range of situations arising under the equal protection clause, many
of which are best dealt with neither through the virtual rubber-stamp of truly
minimal review nor through the virtual death-blow of truly strict scrutiny, but
through methods more sensitive to risks of injustice than the former and yet less
blind to the needs of governmental flexibility than the latter.404
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Ultimately, most courts employing equal protection analysis would probably defer to
legislative fact-finding, a development likely to put plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage.
Courts may accept, uncritically, legislative fact-finding asserting that workers’ compensation
modifications—such as opt-out—are economically beneficial. If those courts also apply
deferential rational basis review, it is less likely that legislative fact determinations would be
disturbed. If, however, legislatures had the burden of showing a substantial relationship between
the policy problem and the chosen legislative solution, cases might receive a very different
judicial reception. For example, if alternative benefit plans under opt-out deliver fewer benefits
to injured workers—particularly to those who are permanently disabled—then the increased
costs to workers must either be absorbed by workers or shifted elsewhere. Courts might then
insist on an explanation of states’ analyses of such large problems.
On the other hand, a court might strike a tort-reform statute even under a “bare” rational
basis analysis. To illustrate, in Estate of McCall v. United States,405 the Florida Supreme Court
struck Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages recoverable in a medical
malpractice action.406 In that case, decedent died as a result of negligent medical treatment
during and after childbirth by Air Force medical personnel.407 The plaintiffs, decedent’s
survivors, alleged medical malpractice and filed a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.408 The court found the United States liable and that the plaintiffs’ economic and
noneconomic damages were $980,462.40 and $2 million, respectively.409 Notwithstanding these
findings, the court limited the plaintiffs’ recovery of wrongful death noneconomic damages to $1
million in accordance with Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages
based on medical malpractice claims.410 The court also denied a motion challenging the
constitutionality of Florida’s wrongful death statutory cap under both the Florida and United
States Constitutions.411 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals,412 the
plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings,413 and, specifically contended that the statutory cap
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.414 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed application of the Florida damages cap,415 but granted a motion to certify four questions
to the Florida Supreme Court, including the question of whether the cap violated equal
protection.416 The Florida Supreme Court struck the cap under equal protection analysis,
applying the rational basis test:
[The cap] has the effect of saving a modest amount for many by imposing
devastating costs on a few—those who are most grievously injured, those who
sustain the greatest damage and loss, and multiple claimants for whom judicially
determined noneconomic damages are subject to division and reduction simply
405
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based upon the existence of the cap. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Florida Constitution . . . we hold that to reduce damages in this fashion is not only
arbitrary, but irrational, and we conclude that it “offends the fundamental notion
of equal justice under the law.”417
In an unusual dissection of legislative findings, the court went to some lengths to dispute
the existence of a medical malpractice crisis, a cross examination culminating in the following
statement:
Thus, even if there had been a medical malpractice crisis in Florida at the turn of
the century, the current data reflects that it has subsided. No rational basis
currently exists (if it ever existed) between the cap imposed . . . and any legitimate
state purpose. . . . At the time, the cap on noneconomic damages serves no
purpose other than to arbitrarily punish the most grievously injured or their
surviving family members. Moreover, it has never been demonstrated that there
was a proper predicate for imposing the burden of supporting the Florida
legislative scheme upon the shoulders of the persons and families who have been
most severely injured and died as a result of medial negligence. Health care
policy that relies upon discrimination against Florida families is not rational or
reasonable when it attempts to utilize aggregate caps to create unreasonable
classifications. Accordingly, and for each of these reasons, the cap on wrongful
death noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions does not pass
constitutional muster.418
Litigants in an equal protection jurisdiction like Florida could expect a lively contest of
workers’ compensation opt-out to the extent it both maintained the exclusive remedy rule and
denied access to a workers’ compensation statute.
D.

Concluding Observations on State Restraint

The foregoing discussion disclosed a great deal of variation on state judicial responses to
plaintiffs’ attempts at restraining legislative initiatives to reduce personal injury remedies. Not
surprisingly, this kind of variation has led to a corresponding variation in litigation environments
for both tort and workers’ compensation litigants throughout the United States. By the end of the
1960s, this patchwork of uneven state court protections had led to a perhaps predictable race to
the bottom.419
The situation eventually compelled President Nixon to convene a bi-partisan commission
of experts to study and make recommendations on the apparent breakdown of state-based
workers’ compensation.420 The National Commission unanimously reported that
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The inescapable conclusion is that State workmen’s compensation laws in general
are inadequate and inequitable. The report listed nineteen “essential
recommendations,” all of which focused on expanding benefits to workers: eight
recommendations dealt with expanded coverage; nine with increased disability
benefits; and two with improvements to medical and rehabilitation benefits.
Based on an insurance industry analysis, the National Commission estimated that
the cost of those expanded benefits would mean that the average employer would
pay 1.5% of payroll (up from 1.1%) toward workers’ compensation insurance.
The Commission predicted that these increased benefits would raise total
insurance costs less than 50% in the vast majority of states.421
During the course of the following decade:
[M]ost states enacted legislation liberalizing benefits to workers—perhaps partly
in response to the Commission’s recommendation that workers’ compensation
should be federalized if states failed to expand benefits. Average state
compliance increased from a level of 6.8 out of the nineteen “essential
recommendations” in 1972 to an average of 12.1 in 1982, when the national trend
toward expansion appeared to level off substantially short of the recommended
goals.422
An expanding opt-out movement reveals a pendulum that has once again swung wildly in
the opposite direction. It can hardly be wondered why tort and workers’ compensation
modifications, and responses to those modifications, move in waves. In sum, no stabilizing legal
consensus across states as to the importance of personal injury rights has emerged. Vacillation
seems at once moral and economic. Our pocketbooks direct elected representatives to rein in
business costs as aggressively as possible. Our moral sensibility periodically intervenes and we
perceive the crudity of a sweeping directive. Unsurprisingly, in the face of the 1960s workers’
compensation race to the bottom, the National Commission seriously entertained the need for
federal intervention if states did not voluntarily enact adequate systems.423 Opt-out does not
suggest a commitment to adequacy.
V.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

An additional potential check on the power of states to severely interfere with the right of
an individual to a remedy for invasions of personal security through mechanisms such as
workers’ compensation opt-out is the federal due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .
. ”424 In addition to imposing procedural restraints on states in connection with deprivations of
421
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life, liberty, or property,425 the Supreme Court has established that the clause may apply to the
substance of state law touching various rights.426 The perennial question has been, which state
rights are delimited by the clause?427 And, the Court has vacillated between a narrow and
broader vision of the scope of the clause.428 In present day, the Court seems to have settled upon
an historical “rooting” of the clause’s meaning and application.429
This Part will first discuss a federal quid pro quo conception of due process and will
contend that the Supreme Court has failed to discredit quid pro quo despite having ample
opportunity to do so. Subpart B. will proceed to discuss the implications of a still viable federal
quid pro quo theory. Subpart C. will then juxtapose quid pro quo with “historical” due process
analysis.430 Subpart D. concludes by arguing that the right to a remedy for personal injury is
important and strongly implied by both the structure and the social contract nature of our legal
system and, therefore, should be recognized as protected by notions of structural due process.
A. Federal Quid Pro Quo
As previously noted, the U.S. Supreme Court, when upholding workers’ compensation
statutes in the twentieth century, appeared to assume the necessity of quid pro quo—that
common law tort rights could not be displaced unless replaced by reasonable or adequate
substitutes.431 However, in Duke Power Co.,432 decided in 1978, the nuclear power industry
persuaded Congress to place a cap on damages resulting from any future catastrophic nuclear
accident in the amount of 560 million dollars per incident.433 Of the number of challenges that
the plaintiffs in Duke Power made to the cap, they argued that such a limitation of liability
violated federal substantive due process.434 The Supreme Court, in rejecting the due process
claim,435 stated, “it is not all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively
enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a
reasonable substitute remedy.”436
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Duke Power involved preemption of state law by federal atomic power policy where the
risk of injury was remote.437 It was generally understood that, in the event of a catastrophic
nuclear incident, victims’ losses would ultimately be underwritten by the U.S. Government;438
there was no genuine question of injury benefit elimination.439 The circumstances were unique
and distinguishable from a broad, state-law swap of tort for workers’ compensation rights and
from the wholesale abrogation of a well-established right by a legislature. Despite this
dissimilarity, it is hard to escape the impression that the Court was subjecting the Price-Anderson
Act440 to heightened scrutiny. Indeed, the Court cited with approval and explicitly contended
that Duke Power was consistent with White:
The logic of [White] would seem to apply with renewed force in the context of
this challenge to the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act not only
provides a reasonable, prompt, and equitable mechanism for compensating
victims of a catastrophic nuclear incident, it also guarantees a level of net
compensation generally exceeding that recoverable in private litigation.
Moreover, the Act contains an explicit congressional commitment to take further
action to aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event that the $560 million
ceiling on liability is exceeded. This panoply of remedies and guarantees is at the
least a reasonably just substitute for the common-law rights replaced by the PriceAnderson Act. Nothing more is required by the Due Process Clause.441
This rhetoric does not have the feel of a “rational basis’ opinion extolling the virtues of
legislative supremacy. On the contrary, the language seems quite justificatory. At the very least,
it seems difficult to draw from the “reasonably just substitute” language a conclusion that the
Court once and for all had slammed the door on quid pro quo due process analyses.
Seven years following Duke Power, the Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, discussed earlier in this Article.442 The petition challenged,
on federal due process grounds, caps on medical malpractice liability in connection with
noneconomic damages.443 As may be recalled, the California Supreme Court specifically
rejected the existence of a quid pro quo due process theory.444 Justice Stevens dissented to the
dismissal, contending that the Court had never decided the federal quid pro quo issue:
Whether due process requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a
quid pro quo for the common-law or state-law remedy it replaces, and if so, how
adequate it must be, thus appears to be an issue unresolved by this Court, and one
which is dividing the appellate and highest courts of several States. The issue is
important, and is deserving of this Court’s review. Moreover, given the continued
national concern over the “malpractice crisis,” it is likely that more States will
enact similar types of limitations, and that the issue will recur. I find, therefore,
437
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that the federal question presented by this appeal is substantial, and dissent from
the Court’s conclusion to the contrary.445
Although it might be argued that the dismissal decided the quid pro quo issue,446 it does
not appear that the Court has thereafter had occasion to address quid pro quo; nor has the issue
been discussed in the federal court as if it had been resolved. If White is dead, neither Duke
Power nor Fein Permanente could have killed it.
It has been well-argued that the quid pro quo test can be inflexible, that it can fail to
distinguish clearly between floor and ceiling challenges to reform, or to help courts in
distinguishing precisely between particular kinds of tort reforms.447 Yet there seems little doubt
that quid pro quo is routinely discussed when courts become uncomfortable with threats to
obviously important rights.
B. Ramifications of a Still-Alive Quid Pro Quo: Revisiting Opt-Out
If workers’ compensation opt-out is recast as personal injury opt-out, the quid pro quo
issue is whether courts will allow legislatures to grant private injurers tort immunity, and
whether such an arrangement is a “reasonably just” substitute for tort rights. The Supreme Court
has hinted at the ceiling of the Due Process Clause in quid pro quo contexts:
The Prince-Anderson Act not only provides a reasonable, prompt, and equitable
mechanism for compensating victims of a catastrophic nuclear incident, it also
guarantees a level of net compensation generally exceeding that recoverable in
private litigation. Moreover, the Act contains an explicit congressional
commitment to take further action to aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event
that the $560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded. This panoply of remedies
and guarantees is at the least a reasonably just substitute for the common-law
rights replaced by the Price-Anderson Act. Nothing more is required by the Due
Process Clause.448
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If that is the ceiling, the question is where this leaves the floor of quid pro quo. Opt-out
“alternative benefit plans” appear to set no floor.449 There is no requirement that the plans pay
any minimum level of benefits.450 In Oklahoma, alternative plans are required to pay the same
“forms” of benefits as those required under the workers’ compensation statute.451 The statute
requires payment of specified benefits for total disability, for partial disability, and for medical
treatment.452 In Tennessee, critics allege that the proposed opt-out bill, S.B. 721,453 leaves
critical substantive workers’ compensation decisions exclusively within the discretion of
employers: coverage of medical expenses, selection of medical providers, deciding whether to
end or continue benefits, and whether to attempt dispute resolution.454 No appeal of eligibility
determinations is mentioned anywhere in the bill.455 Thus, the bill would apparently not confer
plan participants with rights to contest substantive determinations under an alternative benefit
plan.456 Additionally, no procedures for dispute resolution are set forth in the bill, and no
procedures for selection of claim dispute factfinders are identified.457 Unlike the Oklahoma
statute,458 the Tennessee bill would not retain the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy
rule,459 but the right to recover under Tennessee tort law would apparently be modified under the
bill.460 No right to sue would exist if the employee “[fails] to follow instructions and rules,” is
injured by “hazards that are commonly known and appreciated, or if the injury is caused by
“failure to follow available safe alternatives.”461 Thus, employers would be afforded several
affirmative defenses, seemingly of the type that formed the original rationale for states adopting
workers’ compensation in the first place.462
In a detailed study of Texas alternative benefit plans, Professor Alison Morantz found
that, although employees did not have to go through benefit waiting periods under the plans they
faced other obstacles to recovering benefits:
Yet in other respects—for example, the commonplace twenty-four-hour reporting
deadlines, absence of employee choice over medical providers, absence of any
permanent partial or permanent total disability coverage, and prevalent caps on
total benefits—such plan appeared less favorable to employees. Moreover,
presumably in an effort to curb tort liability, a very high fraction (about 85
449
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percent) of nonsubscriber plans channeled disputes to mandatory arbitration. Not
only did virtually all companies deem their programs to be a success and report
cost savings, but most were pleasantly surprised by the magnitude of these
savings, which reportedly exceeded (on average) 50 percent across all
industries.463
Thus, under the alternative plans analyzed by Professor Morantz, entire classifications of
the most seriously injured workers were not eligible for permanent disability benefits and—if
they had signed on to an arbitration agreement as a condition of participating in such a plan—
could also not pursue a tort claim.464 If it is a constitutional requirement under federal quid pro
quo due process for a state legislature to provide a reasonable alternative to a tort remedy, optout might have a very difficult time surviving heightened judicial scrutiny.
C. Quid Pro Quo and Historically-Rooted Rights
Quid Pro Quo may possibly be understood as an inchoate type of historical due process
analysis. The original workers’ compensation grand bargain was understood as a swap of
important rights465 and was historical in at least two senses. First, the swap itself is over a
century old466 and has, therefore, itself become an important part of history and tradition.
Second, the implication behind the bargain is that only a reasonable set of rights could be
substituted for a tort-based right to a remedy for personal injury; a right that is difficult not to see
through Blackstonian lenses.467
In Washington v. Glucksberg,468 Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated what has become a
common formulation in the Supreme Court’s historical substantive due process doctrine:
[W]e have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specifically protects
those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”
Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a “careful description”
of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.469
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In McDonald v. City of Chicago,470 a dissenting Justice Breyer warned against “the reefs
and shoals that lie in wait for those nonexpert judges who place virtually determinative weight
upon historical considerations.”471 Nevertheless, it seems difficult to avoid exploration of the
historical dimensions of personal injury remedies in light of Glucksberg and its progeny.472 The
inquiry resembles this article’s state law “right to a remedy” discussion.473 The heart of the
matter is whether the right to a remedy for personal injury—a right to redress—is “fundamental”
or even important. If it is difficult to identify an explicitly deeply-rooted historical right to a
remedy for personal injury (within or outside a workplace) the matter can hardly be said to be
resolved because:
[T]he most fundamental rights are those that no government of the people would
contemplate abridging—it is doubtful that many courts or legislatures have
discussed whether the government can determine whether we are allowed to
breathe air, but this does not make our access to oxygen any less grounded in
history.474
More to the point, the entire discussion of quid pro quo in White underscores that, at least
at a certain juncture in history, the Supreme Court has likely suspected that right to a remedy for
physical injury was of heightened importance. Whether that sense of importance was from the
due process clause or from elsewhere in the Fourteenth Amendment is difficult to say. The
architects of the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause, for example, had the
benefit of Justice Bushrod Washington’s 1823 interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV of the Constitution in Corfield v. Coryell.475 In Corfield,476 plaintiffs
challenged a New Jersey statute forbidding out of state persons from gathering clams and
oysters.477 Justice Washington rejected the claim that the law ran afoul of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their
becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles
are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by
the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
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possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety;
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for
the general good of the whole.478
Whether John Bingham, a principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment,479 consciously
presumed during the drafting of the Amendment that the right to “obtain safety” 480 was a
“privilege and immunity”481 of citizens is beyond the scope of this discussion.482 It nevertheless
seems plain enough, historically speaking, that colonists, founders, and republicans would have
recognized a right to a remedy for personal injury.483 However, substantive due process runs
deeper than history.
In McDonald, the Supreme Court struck municipal handgun restrictions, extending
Heller’s reach to the states.484 Although not willing to broaden the cramped view of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause (established in the Slaughterhouse
cases),485 Justice Alito ultimately opined that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.486 His opinion, in many respects, mirrors arguments
made in the state courts regarding the historical grounding of tort law and the right to a remedy
for physical injury.487
The right to keep and bear arms was also widely protected by state constitutions at
the time when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. In 1868, 22 of the 37
States in the Union had state constitutional provisions explicitly protecting the
right to keep and bear arms. Quite a few of these state constitutional guarantees,
moreover, explicitly protected the right to keep and bear arms as an individual
right to self-defense. What is more, state constitutions adopted during the
Reconstruction era by former Confederate States included a right to keep and bear
arms. A clear majority of the States in 1868, therefore, recognized the right to
keep and bear arms as being among the foundational rights necessary to our
system of Government. In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.488
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In response to this familiar historical stratagem—attempting to establish that a right was
recognized as fundamental during the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, should
be considered fundamental in present times489—Justice Stevens replied:
More fundamentally, a rigid historical methodology is unfaithful to the
Constitution’s command. For if it were really the case that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of liberty embraces only those rights “so rooted in our
history, tradition, and practice as to require special protection,” then the guarantee
would serve little function, save to ratify those rights that state actors have
already been according the most extensive protection. That approach is unfaithful
to the expansive principle Americans laid down when they ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment and to the level of generality they chose when they crafted its
language; it promises an objectivity it cannot deliver and masks the value
judgments that pervade any analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are
sufficiently “rooted”; it countenances the most revolting injustices in the name of
continuity, for we must never forget that not only slavery but also the subjugation
of women and other rank forms of discrimination are part of our history; and it
effaces this Court’s distinctive role in saying what the law is, leaving the
development and safekeeping of liberty to majoritarian political processes. It is
judicial abdication in the guise of judicial modesty.490
This is where historical analyses often end. One side (it is unimportant which side) will
argue that an important right, though undeniably important, is not sufficiently valued within the
text of the Constitution to warrant careful protection.491 The other side will retort that the right
under discussion has been effectively protected against infringement by the states and “is
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”492 As is the case in state law contexts already
considered, in the absence of a constitutional amendment or of the occasional change of
perspective of a key Supreme Court Justice, there is little more to say once a mode of historical
analysis has been decided upon.493 In the context of the workers’ compensation quid pro quo, it
is unclear whether historical analysis was at the root of the Supreme Court’s view that tort could
not be supplanted without substitution of a reasonably just substitute. It is certainly possible that
the Court may have found the tort right deserving of due process protection irrespective of its
historical significance; however, some work is required to accept such a conclusion.
D. Structural Due Process, Lockean Provisos, and McDonald
No just legal system could conclude that the right to a remedy for personal injury—
particularly, for physical injury—is subject to significant modification or eradication on the
whim of a legislature. However, workers’ compensation opt-out carries the potential for
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eradicating both an underlying tort right and the derivative workers’ compensation right. In a
similar vein, incremental erosion of workers’ compensation rights continually creates the
potential for inadequate remediation of injured workers. Following John Goldberg, this Article
contends that:
[I]t might be helpful to conceive of the right to a law of redress as one of a special
set of due process rights that entitle individuals to certain governmental structures
and certain bodies of law. If this notion of structural due process is sound, it will
encompass more than just tort law, understood as a law for the redress of wrongs.
Contract, criminal, family, and property law likewise seem plausible for
candidates for inclusion.494
As Goldberg has further argued, a structural due process theory can provide a framework
for connecting areas of private and public law.495 The argument for elevating the right to a
remedy for personal injury is not a mechanical appeal to either natural law or to explicit
constitutional text. Rather, it involves an assessment of what our legal tradition has in fact
valued over the centuries. To say to the factory worker that the right to pursue a remedy for the
loss of an arm may be dispensed with whenever a legislature believes a reasonable remedy
would be too expensive is unacceptable on an almost primordial level. Indeed, it raises questions
as to whether individuals would, in the original position, assent to such a social arrangement.
The idea of structural due process centers on intuitions about the nature of this original social
arrangement. Goldberg suggests the structural due process right as potentially:
[U]nderstood as an individual entitlement to certain political institutions,
operating in accordance with certain norms or principles. The right to a vote that
takes place under appropriate conditions, one might argue, is a guarantee of
structure of the same sort as the right to a law for the redress of private wrongs,
and the right to a government of separated powers.496
However, it must be said, respectfully, that this formulation unnecessarily dances around
the primacy of the right to personal, physical security. People who have routinely been exposed
to physical danger have no reason to question the importance of physical security. The
importance of such a right can be vague only to those who are routinely secure.
It is evident that our legal tradition does, in fact, value and protect such a right to personal
security. One does not have to accept the view that only rights deeply-rooted in a formal
historical sense count as “important” to acknowledge with implicit historical evidence what our
legal system has valued. Steven Calabresi and Sarah Agudo have found, for example, that in
1868, two-thirds of state constitutions had provisions guaranteeing unenumerated inalienable,
natural, or inherent rights, and have used the term “Lockean Natural Rights” to refer to those
rights.497 Justice Alito relied on Calabresi and Agudo’s work in McDonald,498 and it is evident
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that the Court has now accepted the existence of unenumerated rights.499 The Lockean
characterization of these rights is traceable to George Mason’s authorship in the original draft of
the Virginia Constitution’s Bill of Rights.500 For purposes of this article, two of Mason’s early
drafts of this language will suffice to illustrate the importance of security to the Framers.
Record of Mason’s Lockean theory of government is first uncovered in a transcript of his
Remarks on Annual Elections for the Fairfax Independent Company in 1775,501 one year prior to
the 1776 adoption of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.502 The main point of the remarks was
that the Fairfax Independent Company should hold annual elections for its militia officers.503
Mason elaborated considerably as follows:
We came equals into this world, and equals shall we go out of it. All men are by
nature born equally free and independent. To protect the weaker from the injuries
and insults of the stronger were societies first formed; when men entered into
compacts to give up some of their natural rights, that by union and mutual
assistance they might secure the rest; but they gave up no more than the nature of
the thing required. Every society, all government, and every kind of civil
compact therefore, is or ought to be, calculated for the general good and safety of
the community. Every power, every authority vested in particular men is, or
ought to be, ultimately directed to this sole end; and whenever any power or
authority whatever extends further, or is of longer duration than is in its nature
necessary for these purposes, it may be called government, but it is in fact
oppression.504
Then, in 1776, Mason submitted his first draft of similar language for the Virginia
“Lockean Rights” constitutional guarantee.505 The language states:
That all Men are born equally free and independant [sic], and have certain
inherent natural Rights, of which they can not by any Compact, deprive or divest
their Posterity; among which are the Enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the
Means of acquiring and possessing Property, and pursueing [sic] and obtaining
Happiness and Safety.506
In each formulation, the right to safety is mentioned.507 This seems unsurprising since in
1765 Blackstone discussed “personal security” as first among the “absolute rights” of the English
law of that time.508
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The purpose of this foray into history is not to say it should be “cited” because it is
history, but rather, because it is correct. It is nearly impossible to suppose that any person would
consciously enter into a society that denies remedy for physical injury caused by wrongful
conduct. While McDonald protects one aspect of personal security—physical self-defense
through firearms509—it is much to be hoped that substantive due process might equally provide
self-defense through utilization of those processes rendering resort to arms less necessary.510
That seems the more fitting ideal of self-defense for a civilized society. At the end of the day,
many people will suffer injury in the workplace. It is true that a number of those injuries will be
truly accidental and would not have been remedied under the law of negligence; yet it is equally
clear that many injuries will have resulted from the negligence of an employer. It is
unacceptable and violative of structural due process that the American legal system could leave
those injured employees without a reasonable remedy for injury. However, that is exactly what
both opt-out and the continuous erosion of workers’ compensation benefits threaten.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is evident that an opt-out movement seeks to persuade states to substantially immunize
employers within their borders from legal liability for workplace injuries. Such a design would
mark a decisive break with the quid pro quo grand bargain of the early twentieth century.
Whether this movement will ultimately succeed depends in large part on the number of state
judiciaries willing to interpret state constitutions as not providing a right to a remedy for personal
injury. Many judiciaries are unlikely to allow such a dramatic encroachment on what has been
understood in many states to be an important, if not fundamental, right. However, there is a risk
of some states getting caught up in a “race to the bottom,” where states not recognizing a right to
a remedy for physical injury become havens of low-cost labor and, thus, exert pressure on states
that safeguard traditional rights to follow suit.
Throughout this Article, workers’ compensation has been discussed in tandem with tort
remedies for personal, and especially physical, injuries. The discussion has, in reality, been a
broader reflection on the limits of tort reform. Whether the particular context in such a
conversation is products liability, medical malpractice, statutes of repose, or workers’
compensation, the underlying issue is the limits of legislative discretion in reducing personal
injury remedies. Opt-out is simply the most recent social consideration of who will bear losses
occasioned by physical injury. However, opt-out crosses a line not often crossed in earlier tort
reform debates. It is one thing to say that noneconomic damages may be capped. It is quite
another to say that the right to economic damages may be significantly circumscribed. To
understand the radical nature of the project it must be constantly remembered that workers’
compensation already represents a significant compromise by workers of economic damages.
An entire range of compensatory damages is simply not available as a result of the Grand
Bargain. A century ago, workers had already completely surrendered noneconomic damages.
Many states struggle politically over the adequacy of benefits provided to injured workers. As
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with Florida, credible arguments can be made that inadequate benefits represent, as a practical
matter, breach of the quid pro quo. Opt-out, without question, completely breaks the Bargain.
Without a legal guarantee of some level of benefits for specified degrees of incapacity,
opt-out is not any kind of legal substitute for tort. The question White was able to defer is
presented in the full light of day: “it perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish all
rights of action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up something
adequate in their stead. No such question is here presented, and we intimate no opinion upon
it.”511 The Court may now be forced to intimate an opinion upon such abolishment and its
jurisprudence may not be up to the task, though Lockean provisos be thrown by the wayside. If
the Court does not intervene, one can anticipate renewed debates about the advisability of
muscular federalization of workers’ compensation as cost-shifts ruble through the economy. If
workers’ compensation does not pay the costs associated with injured workers, something or
someone else will. In that event, privatization of public law will have completed its march
through the domain of employment law and into the very heart of structural due process.
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